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The political philosophy of Bismarck is often imposed from his later career
onto his earlier political activities without asking the question of whether or not the
political pragmatism he dearly practiced later in his life was an evolution or
whether it was always present even in his earliest political activities when he
possessed the reputation of being an arch-conservative in Prussian domestic politics.
This thesis seeks to understand his early political philosophy through his
interaction with the Revolution of 1848, his role in the Reaction and his attitude
and political actions towards Austria during his service in the Federal Diet until late
1852.
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Introduction
Following the Revolution of 1848 the German status quo establish
under Metternich came to an end. Austria and Prussia instead of
determining German politics in agreement from Berlin and Vienna began to
assert their power political interests in German affairs through the German
Confederation. The consequence of success for either Prussia or Austria of
achieving greater power in a more tightly unified Germany was
mediatization for the other. Prussia sought through a plan immediately
following the Revolution of 1848 to corral the smaller and medium states
into a unified Germany under a conservative constitution accepted by the
rulers of these states. At Olmiitz the Prussian government, facing the threat
of a large scale European war and heeding the arch-conservative desire
within its own government for national solidarity between conservative
powers, was forced to sacrifice its union plan and its claims for German
national unity and suffered a serious political defeat both in German and
international affairs. At the same time Austria succeeded in reconvening the
Federal Diet and sought to use its presidential power to try and enhance the
institution into an executive body under Austrian tutelage. While it sought
to expand the Federal Diet, Austria also attempted to break up or enter the
Prussian Zollverein which had come to be an increasingly unifying force in
Germany around Prussia. While both governments paid lip service to
reestablishing the political conservative status quo of pre-1848 politics in the
midst of this struggle, they in reality sought politically, economically and
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through a strong appeal to the growing desire for German national unity in
the Confederation to subjugate the other politically and take over sole
leadership in German politics. It was a political struggle wherein the
dominant motif was political pragmatism and not conservative solidarity.
A prominent figure in these developments was Otto von Bismarck.
From his initial entry into politics as a bitter opponent of the Revolution to
his appointment as the Prussian delegate to the Federal Diet with the
mandate to pursue rapprochement with Austria, Bismarck was viewed as one
of the more vocal and visible arch-conservatives in Prussian politics.
Though he was to enter politics with this arch-conservative reputation, the
path he was to take in German politics and his attitude towards Austrian and
Prussian dualism which he exhibited even in the first three years of his
political activity in Frankfurt show that he was willing to break with
conservative ideals in order to pursue Prussian national interests even at the
cost of conservative national solidarity. Bismarck was guided by the goal of
assuring Prussia the unfettered right of pursuing its German interests. From
his initial step into politics in 1848, Bismarck, claiming the need for Prussian
parity with Austria but nonetheless willing to defend the Olmiitz decision,
began to develop into the statesman who would eventually unite Germany
under Prussian domination while subjugating Austria to a secondary role. It
is clear from the path he was to take that he could not be considered one of
the great conservative preservers as he showed himself willing to break some
of the most basic tenants of conservatism: the maintenance of conservative
supranational solidarity and the complete rejection of any nationalistic or
revolutionary tendencies. In hindsight it can easily be stated that while
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Bismarck sought to preserve the power of the traditional order in Prussia, he
was not motivated by the same divine right political assumptions of his arch-
conservative colleagues, but rather by the practice of Realpolitik, which
mandated that his political allegiance be first of all to pursuing the measured
interests of the Prussian and secondly to any form of ideology or ideal
whether conservative or liberal. The question which must be asked is
whether or not Bismarck's practice of Realpolitik, which he is so commonly
associated with in hindsight, was present in his early years as a politician.
Did Bismarck metamorphous into the Realpolitiker who in 1866 ended
Prussian and Austrian dualism on the battlefield or were the ideological
underpinnings already present explicitly or implicitly during his initial
political activity in Berlin and later Frankfurt? While it is very easy to read
back into Bismarck the political philosophy which defines his political career,
is it possible to see the fundamental assumptions of Realpolitik in Bismarck's
initial political involvement from 1848 to the end of 1852? If these traits can
be ascertained, how is it that Bismarck as a professed conservative Junker was
able in his own mind to reconcile his pursuance of Prussian power needs
even at the cost of supranational conservative solidarity and complete
rejection of the revolutionary concept which his Camarilla colleagues
believed to be the two highest priorities of politics?
4The Pre-history of 1848
The conflict in 1848 which catapulted Bismarck into political life found
its source in the developing contradictions of the previous half century in the
social, political and economic life of Germany. Following the wars of
liberation and the liberal reforms of the vom Stein- Hardenberg governments
in Prussia, the expectations of a developing Mittelstand for greater German
unity were very high. With the establishment of the German Confederation
at the Congress of Vienna, however, Metternich pursued a policy of
repression concerning liberalism and revolution and sought the re-
establishment and protection of legitimate patriarchal states in Germany.1
The creation of the German Confederation, seeking the "maintenance of the
external and internal security of Germany," had at its core the "independence
and inviolability of the individual German states."2 The Federal Diet,
consisting of 39 German states and representatives of a few foreign states with
ties to German princes, embodied the old tradition of state particularism.
Following 1815 the relationship between Austria and Prussia had been
one of cooperation in eliminating the forces of revolution. Prussia however,
through its significant role in the liberation of Germany and its Rhineland
acquisition had gained more influence than previously in German affairs. 3
While Metternich saw the "preservation of Austria's influence over
Germany as essential for the maintenance of the integrity and European
1Eyck, Frank, The Frankfurt Parliament: 1848-1849 (New York: Martin's Press, 1968) 8.
2Snyder, Louis L., Documents of German History (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers
University Press, 1958) 151-153.
3Eyck, Frankfurt Parliament, pp. 8.
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position of the Habsburg Empire,"l he was also sensitive to Prussia's
increasing influence and its claims to a position of parity in German affairs.
He thus pursued a policy of cooperation within German affairs between
Berlin and Vienna in which all important matters were first settled between
the two capitals and then introduced in Frankfurt. In such a fashion the two
powers were able to rule Germany jointly in conservative solidarity.
The triumph of the conservative order following the defeat of
Napoleon was achieved at a time when the rise of industrialization began to
create new social and economic elements which were making the ideals of
this order obsolete. Both a cause and effect of industrialization was
tremendous population growth between 1815 and 1871. Germany
experienced a population growth of nearly 60% during this time. This growth
was most pronounced in the territories where industrialization was
progressing more quickly and Prussia, for example, experienced between 1815
and 1864 a population increase of 87%.2 This growth was to especially
increase the Prussian population and therefore also Prussia's economic and
political influence.
One of the most significant consequence of the industrial revolution
and the accompanying population growth was the rise of a new politically
conscious Mittelstand or bourgeoisie which was comprised of merchants,
shopkeepers, skilled artisans, industrialists and bankers as opposed to the
enlightened Bildungsbiirgertum of scholars and bureaucrats which had
existed in the Prussian reform movement. The bourgeoisie sought free trade
1Ibid., 8.
2Hamerow, Theodore S., The Social Foundations of German Unification 1858-1871:
Ideas and Institutions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1969) 46.
.,.
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and an end to the controlled economy of the past. They believed in the
freedom of movement, repeal of usury laws, and sought common currency,
weights and measures.! Though this new group only gradually developed a
political consciousness, its desires for greater commercial unity in Germany at
a very basic level worked against the conservative values of restoration and
legitimist state particularism. The existence of the numerous trade frontiers
resulting from the existing particularism in the German Confederation was
contrary to such goals and aspirations. This group with time agitated for
other liberal goals such as freedom of the press and stronger voice in the
political affairs of the German states.
These new goals found expression even in the constitution of the
Confederation in paragraph 19 which stipulated that the confederate states
had the right to deliberate at the first meeting in Frankfurt of the Federal Diet
concerning the regulation of commerce and navigation in Germany.2 These
demands were Widespread in Germany at this time and had a broad base of
support.3 Friedrich List was one of many who agitated for the
implementation of paragraph 19 in the Federal Constitution and in a petition
by the Union of Merchants to the Federal Diet in April 1819 he stated that,
"Only the remission of the internal customs, and the erection of a general
tariff for the whole Confederation, can restore national trade and industry."4
The Federal Diet, however, was concerned primarily in pursuing
conservative restoration and issues of commerce were left in the tradition of
1Hamerow, Social Foundations, 97
2Henderson, W.O., The Zollverein (London: Frank Cass and Company LTD, 1959) 25.
3Ibid.,24.
4Ibid., 26.
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particularism to the individual states leaving the rising new Mittelstand
frustrated in its aims.
With the failure of the Confederation machinery to bring about more
economic unity in Germany, numerous states began forming smaller
customs unions. Prussia most aggressively pursed this policy against some
resistance by liberals in Germany who saw such actions as further dividing
Germany. Prussia made its stand on concerning paragraph 19 clear. It was
willing to conclude treaties with individual states, but "was unable to modify
her customs system."l Prussia felt the differences in financial institutions
and industrial interests were too great for the creation of German economic
unity.2 It began reforming its internal commercial and fiscal interests in 1818
with measures which pursued basic goals of replacing the confused mass of
national, provincial, and local dues and import duties with a unified tariff
which would be implemented at the exterior Prussian frontiers and creating
tariffs low enough to make smuggling unprofitable.3 In seeking to include
smaller German states directly on its borders into the customs union, Prussia
hoped not only to further prevent smuggling, but also to connect its two
halves and improve its position militarily. During this time there were also
attempts in both the South and the North to establish commercial unions.
Neither of these attempts were successful. In the South, despite emerging
concepts of creating a "third Germany" which would offset Prussia and
Austria, divergent goals concerning tariff levels and the particularistic egos of
1Price, Arnold H., The Evolution the Zollverein: A study of the ideas and insitutions
leading to German economic unification between 1815-1833 (Ann Arbur: University of Michigan
Press, 1949) 125.
2Price, Evolution Zollverein, pp. 122-123
3Henderson, Zollverein, 37
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the smaller states prevented a comprehensive union.l From this failure the
two states of Bavaria and Wiirttemberg formed a smaller union which in
1829 closed a commercial treaty with Prussia, a precursor to joining the
Zollverein in 1833. The Middle German Customs Union was concerned
primarily with protecting access to duty free British wares as it primarily
consisted of agricultural states. It was more a defensive institution and each
state maintained its own commercial policy.2 Here also the inability to
achieve unity led to the demise of such an attempt.
The single commercial union able to pursue a unified and consequent
commercial policy was Prussia and throughout the 1820's it was able to
expand its commercial ties to most of Germany. The Zollverein was formed
in 1833 and became effective at the start of 1834. It consisted of 162,870 square
miles with a population of 23.5 million people.3 The most significant states
not in it were Hannover, the Habsburg Empire, Frankfurt am Main and
Baden. By 1847 this was down to only Hannover and naturally the Habsburg
lands. Its affairs were managed by an annual General Congress at which
unanimity was necessary for action. Prussia was to undertake all treaties with
foreign powers on behalf of the Zollverein. Though the member states were
to have a voice in Zollverein affairs, their dependence on it pushed them
into a subservient role to Prussia and membership had been achieved,
though with some compromises by Prussia in many cases, by accepting the
Prussian system and policy. Even in the face of traditional political hostility,
such as in the case of Hesse-Cassel, states began to see the necessity of joining.4
1Ibid., 57-63
2Ibid., 64-68
3Ibid., 93-94
4Ibid., 104, 112
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The extensive development of railroads, roads, financial institutions and
infrastructure needed for economic development as a whole began to pull
individual states together around the Prussian dominated Zollverein. 1
The political consequences of this were not lost on contemporaries at
the time and one Prussian minister involved in the formation the Zollverein
wrote in a memorandum in 1829 of the advantages a commercial treaty with
Bavaria and Wtirttemberg would afford Prussia in its relationship to Austria,
which would be economically isolated, and France in case of incursion in the
Rhine area.2 Metternich wrote to the Habsburg Emperor in 1833 that,
"Within the great Confederation, a smaller confederation is being formed ...
under the direction of Prussia. '" Prussia ... will use the satisfaction of material
interests to weaken the influence of Austria over the courts dedicated to her
system, to sabotage their relations with Austria, to make them used to
turning their eyes to Berlin."3 Clearly a strong link was being recognized
between state power and economic influence. The Prussian nationalist
historian Treitschke describes in exaggerated but nonetheless revealing terms
concerning the initial opening of the Zollverein: "Long strings of heavily
laden freight wagons were waiting in front of the customs houses,
surrounded by jubilating crowds."4 He unabashedly ascribes to Prussia that it
"marched unhesitantly towards the attainment of ... the permanent union,
under Prussia's leadership, of all Germany, Austria excluded, by the
1Pflanze, Otto, Bismarck and the Development; The period of the Unification, 1815-
1871 vol. 1 (Princeton, N]: Princeton University Press, 1990) 11-12.
2Henderson, Zollverein, 91-92
3Snyder, Documents, 168
4Treitschke, Heinrich von, History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century trans. Eden and
Cedar Paul, ed. A Graig (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975) 235-236.
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indestructible bond of economic interests."1 This mutual dependence made
Germans recognize "that there could no longer be any separation from the
great fatherland ... and in this indirect political influence lies the historical
significance of the customs union."2 He sees the extension of Prussian power
through the Zollverein as the beginnings of overcoming particularism and
fostering interdependency of the German states. Not all liberal forces
however were in favor of such commercial unions and at the Hambacher
Fest of 1832 it was claimed that the princes through competitive customs
policies had further disunited Germany. Prussia was often a prime target of
this criticism and was accused of using its economic magnetism as a means of
extending its "arbitrary" political rule.3 Regardless of the various standpoints
concerning the Prussian Zollverein, the link was clear between overall
German economic interests and German politics. That state which could bind
the material interests of the other German states to itself would also gain in
the realm of German political influence. In the political struggle for
hegemony in German affairs which was to ensue in the final stages of the
Revolution of 1848 this was to become one of the primary battle grounds as
both Prussia and Austria sought to enhance their position in a way that
would leave the other a secondary role in German affairs and a subsequent
loss of power on the European stage. Immediately following the Revolution
both states began to recognize and exploit the new forces in a swiftly changing
political, economic and social environment in order to enhance their state
IIbid., 235.
2Ibid., 237.
3price, Evolution Zollverein, 171-172.
influence and power in German affairs. It was in the midst of this struggle
that Bismarck was to make his political debut.
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Bismarck's Early Political Perspective
The Iunker
Bismarck began his political career as a representative to the Prussian
United Diet in the 1846-47 session and in the eyes of his contemporaries
quickly showed himself to be of an arch-conservative ideology. He defined
himself early in his political career as being stiindisch- liberal, meaning he
sided with aristocratic opposition to centralizing monarchical power and
bureaucracy, while recognizing the need for a healthy strong monarchy. He
saw the monarchy as a two edged sword which threatened to expand and
subject the aristocracy but which also served as the bulwark of aristocratic
privilege and position. Though he defined himself as stiindisch-liberal, the
events of 1848 impressed upon him the need for protecting the monarchy
from encroachment by parliamentarism in order to protect the position of
Junker in Prussian society from those elements which sought not only
political but also social reform. Bismarck believed the power of the monarchy
and the Prussian state should protect the class interests of the Junker and the
traditional elements of Prussian society in a period of social, economic, and
political change. These traditional institutions in turn served as the basis of
power for the state and the monarchy.l Later in his life Bismarck stated that
throughout his political career he was guided by the principles of a:
1Planze, Bismarck and Development, 70.
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Monarchische Gewalt, ... welche durch eine unabhaengige nach meiner
Meinung staendische oder berufsgenossenschaftliche Landesvertretung
soweit controlliert waere, dass Monarch oder Parlament den
bestehenden gesetslichen Rechtszustand nicht einseitig .. aendern
koennen.1
Bismarck believed fundamentally in preserving the traditional political
relationship between state, aristocracy and the people. While he saw the
potential of a parliament checking arbitrary power and as serving as a
defensive institution against absolutism, he denied it any authority to force
the king against his will in areas of budgetary, military, or affairs of foreign
policy.2 The movement of liberalism and concepts of representative
government lacked any moral or practical justification in the mind of
Bismarck which could give them the right to rule the Prussian state. Such
power according to Bismarck existed only in the traditional order of things
and he stated:
Preussen ist keineswegs durch Liberalismus und Freigeisterei gross
geworden, sondern durch eine Reihe von kraeftigen, entschlossenen
Regenten, welche die militaerischen und finanziellen Kreafte des Staates
sorgfaelltig pflegten und ... sie ... in eigener, selbststaendiger Hand
zusammenhielten.3
Concepts such as liberty or representative institutions could be promoted
until they hampered the interest of the Prussian state in attaining its goals
and protecting its interest. The basis of Prussian strength in pursuing its
interests had always been the monarchy and the traditional order of politics
according to Bismarck.
1Bismarck, Otto, Furst von, Die gesammelten Werke, campI. Dr. Herman von Ptersdorff, vol.
XV (Berlin: Otto Stollberg and Co., Verlag fUr Politik u. Wirtschaft, 1924) 15-16.
2Bismark, GW, 1,375-376.
3Ibid., 375.
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The landed and aristocratic interests accordingly provided the most
dependable protection against bureaucratic absolutism as well as the
Freigeisterei of liberalism. For Bismarck the "soil nourished the healthy
instincts of patriotism and dynastic loyalty; the city bread the loathsome
disease of treason and revolution."l The rural population, according to
Bismarck, was not only the strength of monarchical and aristocratic survival,
but also the backbone of the army and he wrote during the Revolution of
1848:
Wenn wir unserer Landwirtschafft nicht bestehen, dann geht mit dem
Nahrstand auch dem Wehrstand zu Grabe. Der Bauer ist der Kern
unseren Armee, der auch in Not und Drang aushaelt, denn er ist mit
dem Lande verwachsen.... Dem Staedter und Fabrikarbeiter fehlt diese
Empfindung und Eigenschaft, denn mit Pflaster und Backstein kann
man nicht verwachsen. Das land ist das Volk."2
For Bismarck, the backbone of Prussian society was monarchy, aristocracy, and
army and the basis of this was the rural interests and not the cities and
bourgeois liberalism. This Stockpreussentum as he was to often refer to it,
was what he saw threatened by the Revolution of 1848. To the claims of
liberals that they represented the whole German nation Bismarck replied
skeptically, "dass sich in unserem Kammern das eigentliche preussische Yolk
mit seinem praktischen Leben und seinen Interessen doch nur duerftig
vertreten findet."3 Because he saw Prussia primarily as a land whose political
institutions and power were based in the old order, his conceptions of state
and politics were very conservative in that they sought to preserve that order
in Prussia.
1Planze, Bismarck and Devopment, 60
2Bismarck, GW, IX, 90.
3Bismarck, Otto, Furst von, Bismarcks Reden, campI. Helmut Kohl (Berlin: Deutsche
Bibleothek, 1914) 302.
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In a period of social and economic upheaval Bismarck opposed any
compromise of Junker privilege and he quickly found his political niche with
the ultra-conservatives who were represented by the Camarilla or Court
party. This was primarily a group of landed aristocrats seeking to preserve the
old feudalistic relationships in the country side and to protect their privilege
in areas of political power in the face of rising demands for more
representative government and social liberalization such as freedom for the
press and the right of dissent with the government. Bismarck wrote to his
wife in May 1847, "Es ist mir gelungen, einigen Einfluss auf eine grosse
Anzahl der doch einige Abgeordnete der sogenannten Hof-Parthei und der
sonstigen ultra-Conservitiven von mehren Provinzen zu gewinnen."l This
influence was to be the initial base of political support which would enable
him to enter a further political career.
The Revolution of 1848, Social Issues
In February of 1848 a revolution in France sparked uprising
throughout Europe and by March even the conservative centers of Vienna
and Berlin were forced to capitulate to the demands for reform in the
political, social and economic arenas. On March 14 Friedrich William called
the United Diet into session and capitulated to the revolutionary demands
and declared the need for the constitutional reorganization of government
and a program of internal reforms. The United Diet thus proceeded to call for
IBismarck, GW, XIV 89.
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general, equal, but indirect elections for the Prussian National Assembly
which was to be convened in May. While Bismarck made his disapproval of
the king's capitulation clear, he also showed himself willing to accept the
inevitable and stated to the Diet in response to its letter of appreciation to the
King, "dass ... rich] die Adresse, insoweit sie ein Programm der Zukunfkt ist,
ohne weiteres acceptire, aus dem alleinigen Grund, weil ich mir nicht anders
helfen kann."l He accepted the present situation with the belief that the
present ministry was the only means of maintaining an orderly state in
Prussia and that the past could not be brought back, but he criticized the king
whom he partially blamed for the events of past few months as having
himself thrown dirt on the coffin of the old order.2 This resignation,
however, was not to last long and though Bismarck was not elected to the
Prussian National Assembly he played an active role in defending what he
considered conservative rural interests throughout the revolution until the
beginning of the reaction in December of the same year. In his final speech to
the United Diet on April 10 Bismarck, in rejecting a proposal for funds to
alleviate the economic distress resulting from the revolution, stated in no
uncertain terms that he saw the Revolution as a conflict between rural and
urban interests. For Bismarck the liberals possessed only the appearance of
popular support and he stated that the peasants were deceived by certain
elements of Bildung und Intelligence who seduced them by appealing to their
immediate desires and promising to free them from feudal payments.3
Bismarck ultimately believed, however, that the interests and the allegiance
1Bismarck, Reden, I, 45£.
2Ibid., 77-78
3Bismarck, GW, XV, 28.
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of the peasantry lay with the conservative order. The liberals he believed
would not be able to rule all Germans, but represented merely a small
segment of German life, primarily the interests of urban bankers and
industrialists. Taxation and allocation of state resources he stated must be
done with objectivity and with an eye to the good of the whole state and he
feared that those in power:
Die Zustaende unseres Vaterlandes mehr durch die Brille des
Industrialismus auffast, als mit dem ldaren Auge des Staatsmannes, der
aIle Interessen des Landes mit gleicher Unparteilichkeeit ueberblickt; ich
fuerchte deshalb, dass bei der neuen Belastung die Last vorzugsweise auf
die Platte des Lands und auf die kleinen Staedte gewaelzt werden wird,
und dass die Verwendung der aufgebrachten Mittel ueberwiegend der
Industrie und dem Geldverkehr der groesseren Staedte zu Gut kommen
wird.l
Agrarian reforms such as the repeal of the tax exemption for the Junker and
the nullification of many remaining manorial obligations of the peasantry by
the new liberal cabinet and assembly directly attacked the material interests of
the aristocracy and were an attempt according to conservatives to promote
city interests over traditional landed interests. The conservatives believed
that liberals sought to undermine their traditional hold on political power
and the bureaucracy by undermining the aristocratic economic independence
which had allowed them to provide the traditional leadership in the
government and military. The dominance of the agricultural interests had to
be protected against the bankers and industrialists because capitalism would
undermine the form of society which had become rooted in the agrarian
economy and II was a threat to the class differences defining a man's rights
and obligations, since it preached a divisive individualism inconsistent with
1Bismarck, Reden, I54f.
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the corporate ideal."l Under such a system the leaders and population would
not serve the overall interests of the community but would all become slaves
to the tyranny of the "cash nexus." Industrialists and bankers would not be
able to "conceive of a political authority with higher ideals and powers than a
business enterprise."2 The hierarchical social system dominated by landed
nobility could not survive under the rule of industrial capitalism in a society
dominated by the thinking of liberalism. From an ultra-conservative
perspective the principle at stake in the revolution was more than merely
preserving their power. Their whole political perspective was based upon
divine right authority. For conservatives such as the Gerlach brothers of the
Camarilla insisting on the traditional order was as much a matter of living in
accordance with the will of God as protecting or justifying their own power
political interests. One sees clearly the conviction with which the
conservatives attacked the concepts of revolution and liberalism as the
"Devil's work." These conservatives sought to curb the innovations of time
and this traditionalism made it impossible for them to accept the demands of
liberalism or deal viably with the hardships and real needs of the lower
classes due to the social and economic upheaval of the early 19th century.
Gerlach in considering the plight of much of the lower class and the demands
of liberalism stated, "If people had faith like a grain of mustard seed, then
soon there would no longer be any talk about all this stuff."3 Such
conservatives saw both "revolution" and "Revolution." They felt compelled
to repress events such the French Revolution or the Revolution of 1848, but
I Hamerow, Social Foundations, 207.
2Ibid., 193.
3Ibid., 20.
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they saw the problem as a much broader development towards materialism
and political and social liberalism which contradicted what they considered a
divinely determined world order. In defending the Holy Alliance against the
claim that it was an association of princes against the people, Leopold von
Gerlach stated:
The princes declare that they derive their power from God, and that they
want to rule in accordance with God's commandments. It was precisely
this ... which the revolutionaries did not like. There should no longer
be any authority instituted by God. Men wanted to establish it by
themselves, to control it by themselves, and rulers should become
subjects.... You cannot and must not disavow the principle of the Holy
Alliance. They are nothing other than that authority comes from God,
and that the princes must accordingly govern as agents commissioned by
God.1
While such thinking was dominant in Bismarck's social circle, he was to take
a very different approach in facing the difficulties which his state and class
faced at the time.
In response to this threat from the revolution Bismarck, among many
other conservatives, saw the need to take practical steps in defending the
interests of their class. Two ventures which he was particularly involved in
were the founding of the Kreutzzeitung, or Die neue preussische Zeitung,
and the establishment of the Junker Parliament. The purpose of this new
conservative paper, which was to become a significant voice for the
conservative political party, was stated as "opposing the paper
constitutionalism of doctrinaire speculation with the historic
constitutionalism of natural tradition," and the, "restoration of the corporate
1Ibid., 183£.
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balance between crown and estates."l The Junker Congress, which met in
Berlin in August of 1848, was a political gathering by conservative Aristocrats
to put pressure on the king to resist further incursions on landed interests. In
a letter to Friedrich William from the Junker Congress, Bismarck wrote that
the reforms of the liberal cabinet were a "Confiscation des Vermoegens
derjenigen Unterthanen, mit einer Willkuehr, wie nur Eroberer und
Gewaltherrscher sie bisher uebten."2 These "arbitrary measures" were the
action of "einer anderen wohlhabenden Klasse" promoting
"Privatforderungen" against the "Adelstand." He further harked back to the
traditional relationship between king and aristocracy and the kings obligation
to protect that.
While the congress was supposed to be a unified representation of
conservative interests, it became clear that many conservatives did not
adhere to the romantic conservatism which sought to turn back the clock on
social and economic developments, but rather wanted to insure the survival
of their privileges and interests as a group. They thus did not view
themselves as being above the politics of interest and appealing to the
political and material desires of the peasantry as opposed to insisting
primarily on the moral imperative of divine right authority and the moral
axioms of the feudal order rooted in a religious organization of society. The
program of the congress and the new political activity of these conservatives
made it clear that they were willing to court those groups with traditionalist
sentiments such as artisans and peasants, which they saw as having divergent
1Hamerow, Theodore 5., Restoration, Revolution, Reaction: Economics and poltiks in Germany,
1815-1871 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969) 177f.
2Bismarck, GW, I, If.
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material interest from the urban and industrial population.1 These methods
were to make clear the divergent ideological underpinnings between the old
and new conservatives. New conservatives were willing to fight their cause
in terms of interest and economics and not just ideals of legitimacy. While
old school conservatives such as the Gerlach brothers found the Junker
Parliament already too materially oriented, Bismarck saw the Congress as
"eine Interessevertretung."2 He pointed out:
Wir leben in der Zeit der materiaellen Interessen.... Es ist naturlich,
dass die Staedter dahin streben, der Steuererheber von der
Fabrikindustrie, von dem staedtischen Hauswerth, von dem Rentier
und Capitalisten so fern als moeglich zu halten und ihn lieber auf Acker
und Wiesen und deren Producte anzuweisen.3
He wrote in a letter to Herman Wagner, "daher muessen wir schon so
materiell sein unsere materiellen Interessen zu verteidigen."4 Though the
differences here in ideology between traditionalist and new conservatives
were initially a question of degrees and not complete incompatibility, they
were to be accentuated in the future ideological struggle which would ensue
between Leopold Gerlach and Bismarck as a delegate to the Federal Diet in
Frankfurt concerning Prussia's relationship to Austria as a conservative
power. Bismarck was to stress the practical needs of the Prussian state and
Gerlach would continue to insist on the moral imperatives of traditional
supra-national conservative solidarity.
The reaction came almost as quickly as the Revolution, which by early
1849 had lost much of its impetus. The Frankfurt Parliament in the
1Hamerow, Restoration, 179£.
2Marcks, Erich, Bismarck und die Revolution 1848-1851, (Berlin: Deutsche Verlag-Anstalt,
1939) 58£.
3Bismarck, GW, XV, 27-28.
4Bismarck, GW, XIV, 112
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Paulskirche failed to secure itself a firm power base either in the mass
population or by resolving the German national question. The liberals, who
were able to ride to power in March 1848 to a large extent on the
revolutionary threat posed by the lower classes of artisans, workers and
peasants, had as their first goal the desire to create a responsible and moderate
government.l The groups which had propelled them into power, however,
were less interested in the political ramification of parliamentary
government and constitutions as with improving their material lot which
had experienced great upheaval due to industrialization.2 This is clear in the
numerous calls for guilds, the call for more protective tariffs, and the frequent
destruction of machinery by those angered by loss of work and falling wages.3
There was thus a strong divergence of interests between those who were
elected to Frankfurt and those who had provided the threat of violence which
had forced the various rulers into compromise.4 The bourgeois liberals,
"while exploiting the threat of mass upheavals to get their own programs of
reform accepted, favored a limited revolution. liS Once in power liberals were
concerned with achieving order and quickly pacified peasants through
agrarian reforms while at the same time trying to stabilize the economy.
When such attempts failed they were willing to use troops to repress violent
instability.6 This desire for order, which was needed to created a new political
1Hamerow, Restoration, 138.
2Sheehan, James J., German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century, (Chicago: University of
Chicaog Press, 1990) 63.
3Hammen, Oskar J., "Economic and Social Factors in th Prussian Rhineland in 1848," in
American Historical Review, 104(1949), 827-830.
4Sheehan, German Liberalism, 52.
5Hammen, "Economic and Social Factors," 839.
6Hamerow, Restoration, 113£.
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system, was accentuated by a general distrust of the masses as a reasonable
political force. It was felt that the masses did not have the political
enlightenment needed to sacrifice immediate material gain for long term
political goals. One contemporary historian wrote of the masses, "It is so
difficult to work with them, to teach and to guide them," and even less
flattering, "Under the best of circumstance it is a cloud of dust filling the air
and obscuring the view, until a gentle rain settles the whirling mass into the
thick and sticky form which we commonly call mud."l With the Frankfurt
Parliament's failure concerning the national issue and its inability to bring
the individual states into submission under the new constitution, it found
itself isolated from the forces which had propelled it into power. Bismarck
was to write in his later years that the revolution underestimated the power
and resiliency of the German monarchies, especially those of Austria and
Prussia, and that they overestimated the power of the barricade and the threat
of violence which the masses posed.2 Liberalism did lack a solid and broad
base of support for its political aims.
The German Question and the Reaction
The Revolution of 1848 was not merely a social revolution. A major
force behind it was the desire in a large segment of the German population
for a united German state. The nationalist ideal of all Germans existing in a
single state, however, did not fit the particularistic realities of the past. The
1Hamerow, Social Foundations, 163£
2Bisarmck, Otto, Furst von, Bismarck: The Man and Statesman, 61f£
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Frankfurt Parliament ultimately failed to find a solution for the difficulties
which the tradition of German dualism between Prussia and Austria and
small state particularism posed in creating a unified state. The first issue to be
tackled in solving the national question was what to do with the Austrian
non-German lands. The debate in Frankfurt concerning the composition of
the new state began on October 19 and was the stumbling block which
eventually left the parliamentary attempt at German unification in ruin. The
first paragraph of the new constitution stated that all German states in the
Confederation were to be included in the new state. Paragraph 2 and 3 of the
new constitution, however, stipulated respectively that no part of the
German Nation could be united into a unified state with non-German
territories and that if this situation did exist that the non-German territories
were to be governed on the basis of a personal union between crowns.1 Those
who supported such measure saw the "separation of German Austria from
the rest of the Habsburg monarchy as a natural outcome of the development
of the national principle."2 This was a direct assault on the Austrian Empire.
The disjointed history of Germany complicated the criterion as to what could
be viewed as belonging to Germany despite the presence of non-German
nationalities. Those in Frankfurt, for example, were not willing to give up
Bohemia.3 Adherence to this principle meant that Austria would either join
the new German state and maintain its non-German lands separately or
remain a part of the Habsburg monarchy. The two measures would have led
to the weakening of the Habsburg Empire, a development which many did
1Eyck, Parliament, 322.
2Ibid., 326.
3Ibid., 326.
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not find in the interest of Germany or Europe) The Frankfurt Parliament
eventually proved unable to enforce these stipulations on individual states,
specifically Austria and Prussia, at the cost of state sovereignty.
The issue was brought to a head by the conflict over the type of
monarchical government the Frankfurt Parliament would establish in
Germany. The two viable options proposed were referred to as the Gross- and
Kleindeutschland proposals. The first option would have made Austria the
preeminent power in the German state and the second Prussia. Here the
differences which existed within Germany became quit clear, specifically
between the Protestant North and the Catholic south. The Kleindeutsch plan
promoted by the Erbkaiserliche party, which sought to establish the Prussian
Hollenzollern line as a hereditary monarchy over the new Germany, would
have effectively put Prussia in charge of Germany. It would have inevitably
led to the mediatization of Austria and was unacceptable to any self respecting
Austrian.2 The Grossdeutsch plan would have given the imperial crown to
the Austrian Habsburg line allowing for a personal union with the non-
German lands with the consequence that Prussia would have been
mediatized. At the heart of the Grossdeutsch plan were the Austrian and
Bavarian delegates who opposed domination of Germany by a northern
power out of allegiance to both "their states and their religion."3 The idea of a
Protestant state possessing the imperial crown over traditionally Catholic
states was unacceptable to these Catholic states. Delegates from Protestant
states such as Hannover and Baden or free cities such as Hamburg, while
1Ibid., 327.
2Ibid., 363.
3Ibid., 366.
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distrustful of Prussian domination, likewise distrusted the Catholic influence
in politics.l Thus the question was influenced not only by political issues
concerning the structure of the new state, but also by the basic cultural and
religious differences within the empire.
The discussions in Frankfurt over these two proposals had become
irrelevant by December 1848 as the reaction in Prussia and Austria had
already begun to take hold and the old order of aristocracy and monarchy
with the army began to reassert itself. On November I, Friedrich William
called a new conservative cabinet. The Prussian National Assembly upon
giving a vote of no confidence concerning the new cabinet was adjourned and
moved to the town of Brandenburg outside of Berlin. On November 12, the
government declared a state of siege and Berlin was occupied by troops. As a
last gasp effort a small number of delegates met in a Berlin cafe and denied
the government the legitimate right to raise taxes and, without success,
appealed to the Prussian citizens to not do so. In that same month a
delegation from the Frankfurt Parliament sought to secure Prussia's adhesion
to the constitution by offering the imperial crown. Athis point Friedrich
William IV made it clear that Prussia would not be able to choose for the
other states whether or not they would enter the new state. Such a move
according to Friedrich would pose too many political difficulties in Prussia's
relations with Austria.2 On December 5 he unilaterally decreed a new
conservative constitution in Prussia which implemented many liberal
features, but which insured the dominance of the moderate and conservative
1Ibid., 367.
2Eyck, Parliament, 336; Huber, Prof. Dr. Ernst Rudolph, Dokumente zur deutschen
Verfassungsgeschichte, (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1961) 334.
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interests of Prussia. This was all a prelude to April 3, 1849 when Friedrich
William IV gave a final rejection of the imperial crown. While recognizing
the "voice of the people," could not answer it, "ohne das freie Einverstanden
der gekroenten Haeupter, der Fuersten und freien Staaten Deutschlands."l In
the same statement he revealed what was to be the Prussian union plan, by
which Friedrich William sought to achieve the acceptance of a revised
Frankfurt constitution by the legitimate governments of the German states.
This was the final nail in the Frankfurt Parliament's coffin. With this the
moderate elements of the Parliament packed their bags and left the radical
elements to pursue their own aims. Prussian military force put a final end to
the radicalization of the revolution and uprisings throughout Germany,
specifically in Baden, Saxony and numerous smaller states and conservative
governments were reestablished.
Prussian Union Plan
As a result of its role in crushing the revolution in Germany and
Austria's continued struggle in Italy and Hungary a this time, Prussia had
nearly a free hand in German affairs which it used in pursuing a plan of
unification which was the brain child of the conservative Joseph Marie
Radowitz. This union plan sought to gain the imperial crown for the
Hollenzollern monarchy on the basis of a revised Frankfurt constitution with
the only major difference being that it would come not from the hand of the
IHuber, Dokumente, 329.
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people but from that of the princes. This plan sought to create a parliament
representing the individual conservative states which would then revise the
Frankfurt constitution to fit its own conservative tastes. It would have
consisted of two houses, one a general representative house, and the other a
gathering of the represented legitimate governments. In such efforts
Radowitz saw the possibility of creating a new "moralischen Boden" in the
form of constitutionalism and popular national support under conservative
auspices by which the Prussian king would be able to rule Germany.l
Bismarck later wrote unflatteringly of Radowitz and his political agenda:
Radowitz made a skillful keeper of the medieval wardrobe in which
the King dressed up his fancies, and contributed thereby to make the
King dawdle away the opportunity for practical intervention in the
development of the present over historical questions of form, and
reminiscences of the annals of the Empire.2
The Austrian monarchy would be offered a personal union with strong ties
in areas of foreign policy and commercial interests. In the face of the forces
threatening to destroy the Habsburg Empire, Schwarzenberg had in March
shown his willingness to accept a Prussian expansion of power if it would in
turn respect the unity of the Austrian Empire.3 Later developments will
show, however, that Austria was in no way willing to accept the loss of its
preeminent position in German affairs and that it was merely buying time for
itself to consolidate control in its own territories.
From the start the smaller German states were dependent on Prussia
for their very existence in the face of the revolution and from the medium
states who saw this as an opportunity for gobbling up smaller weaker
1Meinecke, Fredrich, Radowitz und die Deutsche Revolution, (Berlin: E.S. Mittler, 1913) 532.
2Bismarck, Man and Statesman, 71.
3Meinecke, Radowitz, 243-244.
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neighbors. Bavaria, for example, was interested in creating a hegemonial area
for itself in the South separate from both Austria and Prussia and saw its
weaker and smaller neighbors as possible areas of expansion.1 The natural
opponents of the plan were the medium states of Hannover, Saxony, Bavaria,
Wiirttemberg, Bavaria and Baden, who saw union with Prussia in the
absence of Austrian-Prussian dualism as a threat to their sovereignty and the
possibility of mediatization. The southern states, specifically Bavaria and
Wiirttemberg, were to offer the most resistance to such a plan while
supporting their more traditional ties to Austria. Saxony was indebted to
Prussia for squashing the revolutionary rebellion in Dresden. Hannover,
because of its geographic position to Prussia, saw itself as having no other
choicebut to join. While Austria was in no position to offer direct resistance
to the Prussian union plan, which still embodied the same basic power issues
as did the Frankfurt attempts, it did nonetheless quietly support resistance
behind the scenes.2 By October Prussia had succeeded in forming the
Dreikonigsbund of Saxony, Hannover and itself as well as securing the
adhesion of Baden, but this success was to be short lived.
In November, Felix von Schwarzenberg was appointed to head up a
new conservative Austrian government. Schwarzenberg was "ganz
Oesterreicher" and there existed for him, absolutely in the spirit of
Realpolitik, "ein oesterreiches Grossmachtinteresse mit ihm unscheidbar
verbundene mitteleuropaeische Notwendigkeiten, kein berechtiges deutsches
nationalstaatliches Wollen."3 On October 31 Windischgratz recaptured
lSrbik, Heirich Ritter von, Deutsche Einheit, Zweiter Band, (Miinchen: F. Bruckmann KG,
1935) 23£.
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Vienna only a day after the Hungarian rebels were defeated. With both
Hungary and Italy defeated and forced back into the Austrian Empire by
August 1849, Schwarzenberg began to pursue Austrian interests in Germany.
This strengthened the resistance of the medium states, who were at best only
unwilling participants in Prussia's union plans. Schwarzenberg, as an
adherent of Realpolitik, was the absolute enemy of any concept of Klein- or
Grossdeutschland plans if either meant the mediatization or division of the
Austrian Empire. On November 27, in response to Frankfurt's attempt to see
if Austria would accept the stipulations of the constitution in order to obtain
the imperial crown, Schwarzenberg formulated his program of Kremsier
before the Austrian Reichstag stating:
Oesterreichs Fortbestand in staatlicher Einheit ist ein deutsches, wie
europaeisches Bedurfnis.... Erst wenn das verjuengte Oesterreich und
das verjuengte Deutschland zu neuen und festen Formen gelangt sind,
wird es moeglich sein ihre gegenseitigen beziehungen staatlich zu
bestimmen. bis dahin wird Oesterreich fortfahren, seine Bundespflicht
treulich zu erfuellen.1
Here Schwarzenberg openly challenged Frankfurt's authority to carry out its
national plans and also made clear that he would not accept any division of
the Habsburg empire. In the spirit of Realpolitik Schwarzenberg sought to
secure for a unified Austrian primacy in Central European affairs.2 This he
planned to achieve by imposing Austrian dominance both politically and
economically in German affairs. The first goal would be achieved through
the re-establishment of the Federal Diet with expanded executive power and
influence in Confederate affairs under a unified Austrian empire and the
second would be achieved by forcing the whole of Austria into the
1Huber, Dokumente, 291
2Srbik, Einheit, I, 388ff.
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Zollverein, creating an economic area from the North Sea to the Adriatic.
The two goals went hand in hand in seeking to establish Schwarzenberg's
dream of a German empire of 70 million under Austrian hegemony.l
Bismarck's Nationalism
Bismarck did not support in any way the liberal efforts of the Frankfurt
Parliament in unifying Germany. He clearly believed that at least Prussian
and Austria had the right to exist as separate powers at a European level
separate from any concept of a unified German nation. When faced with the
question of Polish nationalism Bismarck as a conservative in the United Diet
in 1848 clearly expressed a historical view of Germany which included all of
the non-German lands which had fallen to German control or which had
been conquered including Poland, Italy and Austria's non-German lands in
Hungary and Bohemia.2 Such a perspective was in contradiction with the
liberal view of nationalism which stipulated that culture and language
coincide with national borders and political institutions. Bismarck viewed
the basis of German nationalism as being limited to that of the "spirit of
1813," which he described as hatred against foreign oppression and occupation
and not the a desire for unity.3 He thus perceived nationalistic sentiments as
existing within the traditional order of particularism, specifically in the case
of Austria and Prussia. The concepts of Vaterland and Prussia were for
1B6hme, Helmut, Deutschalnds Weg zur Grossmacht, (K6ln: Verlag Kiepenheuer und Witsch,
1966) 19-20.
2 Bismarck, GW, XIV, 106.
3Bismarck, GW, XIV, 89.
.....
31
Bismarck synonymous.l His nationalism was for Prussia and not for
Germany.2 Given his views on nationalism it is possible to see Bismarck's
"image of Germany" being determined by three factors: "A historical factor, a
specifically Prussian factor and, and inseparably bound up with the first two, a
power political factor."3 Historically Germany was "das alte Reich." He did
not question the right for any German state to conquer and posses non-
German territories whether in Poland, Hungary, Italy or any other country
and thus did not question Austria's claim to its non-German territories. The
specifically Prussian factor was that Prussia, as part of the historical Germany,
should deal with Austria and all other states first individually at a European
level and secondly as a member of the Confederation. The final point was
Bismarck's belief that Prussia as a European great power had the irrevocable
right to pursue its own power interests. The final two points were to be the
factors which would determine Bismarck's attitude towards Austria in the
developing conflict during and after the revolution.
1Pflanze, Bismarck and Development, 67
2Marcks, Bismarck und die Revolution, 42f. .
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The Humiliation of Olmiitz
Federal Diet or Union Plan
In a circular of April 1850 Schwarzenberg willed those states not in the
Prussian union to meet in Frankfurt and on September 2 constituted the
assembly as a complete Federal Diet. On October 5 Prussia set the election date
for the Union Parliament which was to meet in Erfurt for January 15. Only 15
days later with Austria once again asserting itself politically both Hannover
and Saxony withdrew. Schwarzenberg now began to tighten the noose
around the union plan's neck and in November announced that the federal
constitution of 1815 remained in effect and the basis of German domestic
relations. Schwarzenberg sought to reassert the claims of the new Federal
Diet but in a relationship where Austria clearly held the lead role in German
affairs.
The political struggle between the Prussian union plan and
Schwarzenberg's attempt to re-establish the Federal Diet was brought to a
head when the reactionary Elector of Hesse-Cassel, locked in a bitter dispute
against a majority in the Parliament and also a large section of his
bureaucracy and army concerning constitutional reforms, turned to the
Federal Diet in November for aid in protecting his legitimate claim to power.
This request specifically recognized the Federal Diet in the legal form of 1815
in a way which favored Schwarzenberg's desire to reestablish its power in
-
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German affairs.l The diet in Hesse-Cassel, however, sought the support of
Prussia in the struggle and both powers saw the conflict as an opportunity to
assert themselves in the German question, Prussia seeking to solve the
problem through what was left of the Prussian union attempt and
Schwarzenberg seeking to secure the final recognition of the Federal Diet in
Germany.2 In the Bregenzer Punktation of October 12 Austria, Wurttemberg,
and Bavaria committed themselves to the continued support of the Federal
Diet and to military support for the enforcement of its decisions in the Hesse-
Cassel conflict. Such a move by the Confederation would have meant the
occupation of the Ettapenstrassen which connected the east and west sides of
Prussia. This was something which Prussia could not allow either from a
political standpoint, because it would have meant the clear end of the
Prussian Union Plan and a serious loss of political prestige, or strategically, as
it would have made Prussia very vulnerable militarily. As both sides
mobilized for a what seemed an inevitable conflict, Friedrich William IV
requested the intercession of the Czar of Russia. While this may have
temporarily prevented a war, it did not help the Prussian position as Czar
Nicolas was adamantly opposed to the Radowitz plan and supported a return
to the status quo of 1815 of conservative solidarity against revolution which
had existed in the spirit of the Holy Alliance.3 He thus favored
Schwarzenberg's plans of reconstituting the Federal Diet as the basis of
German politics.4 While Friedrich William was willing to sacrifice the union
1Call, Bismarck, 75.
2Srbik, Einheit, II, 55-59.
3Mosse, W. E., The European Powers and the rGen:nan Question, (Cambridge: University Press,
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plan, he had difficulty in accepting such an insult to Prussian military honor
and Prussia's position as a European great power. He was faced with the
choice of losing credibility and prestige for the Hollenzollern crown or
breaking conservative solidarity and risking a war which he might very well
lose.l While publicly rejecting an ultimatum by Austria and the Federal Diet
to allow the passage of federal troops on November 25, he sent Manteuffel as
Minister President to speak directly with Schwarzenberg. There Manteuffel
arranged the Olmtitz Conference of November 29. Prussia there recognized
the right of the Federal Diet to intervene in the Hesse-Cassel conflict and
ended its blockade of the federal troops enroute to enforce the federal
decision. The union plan was irrevocably lost. This progression of events led
to the resignation of Radowitz and the summoning of the Camarilla
conservative Otto von Manteuffel. He and his political backing were
ideologically opposed to the Briiderzwist between conservative German
powers and were willing to make significant concessions in Prussian power
and prestige to pursue conservative solidarity.
The Olmtitz conference of November 29 was the political opportunity
to subjugate Prussia which Schwarzenberg had been pursuing. The military
honor of Prussia was completely humiliated as Prussia was forced to be the
first to demobilize in Hesse-Cassel and accept confederate authority even in
an area most sensitive to Prussian security. At the same time it was forced to
re-enter the German Confederation. As compensation for such concessions
there was to be arranged a ministerial conference in Dresden of the German
states concerning the conditions for Prussia's reentry into the Federal Diet
1Meinecke, Radowitz, 508.
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and the possibility for federal reform in granting the Prussian desire for
parity. That these reforms would not be achieved was a mute question as
Austria had already succeeded in establishing an alliance within the Federal
Diet against Prussia. From January to May 1851 at Olmtitz and the following
conference in Dresden Prussia failed to receive the recognition that her
military and economic strength warranted in German affairs} The only
compromise granted was the opportunity to further pursue such reforms in
the Federal Diet. Though Olmtitz was a serious political defeat, it was also
not a complete victory for Schwarzenberg because was forced to some degree
of reconciliation by the conservative ideals of Russia and the Austrian
Emperor. His dream of an empire of "70 Million" remained unfulfilled as
these two monarchs sought the re-establishment of the status quo in the
Federal Diet and German politics. Schwarzenberg was forced to moderate his
objectives and as a concession for the sacrifice of the union plan, did not
pursue the inclusion of a unified Habsburg empire in the Federal Diet.2 In
the end this opportunity did not afford Schwarzenberg the complete political
victory over Prussia which he had hoped for. What was eventually achieved
was a facade of the status quo of pre-revolution politics. It is often stated that
Olmtitz was merely a reprieve in the struggle over the "German question,"
which was to be finally settled in 1866.3 While Prussia had lost a serious
political battle, it had managed to avoid a complete defeat at the hands of the
Austrians.
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Zollverein Conflict
As the political struggle for either the dominance of the Prussian
union plan or the Federal Diet began to climax, it was paralleled by the
Austrian attempt to enter the Zollverein. The Zollverein was an ominous
barrier between Schwarzenberg and his plans as it served as a unifying factor
within the German Confederation around Berlin. It appealed to the material
interests of the small and medium German states and could have potentially
served as the basis of a Kleindeutschland which would have left Austria on
the outside of Germany looking in.1 Schwarzenberg, who was keenly aware
of this, detailed in January in a memorandum that Austria would seek to
purse its unifying plans by also pursuing the material interests of Germany
economically. It would, in addition to opposing Prussia's attempt to question
the competence of the newly constituted Federal Diet, challenge Prussia's
domination of the Zollverein. Karl Ludwig von Bruck, who became
Schwarzenberg's advisor and Minister of Commerce in 1848, was the main
driving figure behind the attempt to create the commercial area which would
encompass an "empire of 70 million." His plan of an "empire of 70 million"
would have extended Austrian dominance from the Baltic to the Adriatic and
would have included all of Germany as well as Austria's non-German lands.
Bruck began to feel out the attitude of the more protectionist oriented states
in Southern Germany already during the Revolution. He skillfully used the
pro-Austria press to promote his ideas of a German wide customs union.
This created quite a reaction as such thinking was appealing to a large number
1Ibid., 92.
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of Germans who saw this as a serious attempt at creating greater German
unity through economic relations. An attempt to expand the Zollverein to
include Austria or absorb it into a greater economic union was thus
inseparably linked to an attempt by to win the influence of public opinion.!
Bruck sought ideally to mold the economic regions of Germany into a single
unit by achieving Austria's inclusion into the Zollverein, thus breaking
Prussia's exclusive control in this area. Bruck first proposed his plan in
October 1849, suggesting the expansion of the Zollverein into a large customs
union which would have included the Zollverein, the Steuerverein and all
of the Austrian Empire. He proposed 4 phases in which tariffs within the
whole region would be brought closer together with the Steuerverein and the
Zollverein gradually raising theirs while Austria lowered its own.
Commerce, currency transactions and transportation in the trade area would
also be facilitated.2 While Austria was in the process of modernization and
industrialization, the pace and success of such reforms were very moderate
when compared to those in other German states which were experiencing
tremendous economic growth, much of which was focused around the
Zollverein.3
While Bruck was by nature not a Realpolitiker, Schwarzenberg sought
to use such economic appeal in his efforts subjugate Prussia in Germany. In a
memorandum of May 1850 Bruck, under Schwarzenberg's influence, further
expounded on his goals. It became clear that the "revived Germanic
1Lange, Wilhelm Friedrich, Bismarck und die offentliche Meinung Siiddeutschland wiihrend
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Confederation and the proposed Austro-German customs union would be
linked as closely as possible."1 The two were thus seen as inseparable parts of
the same plan in gaining for Austria absolute dominance in German affairs.
Delbriick, the Prussian Minister of Commerce, responded to the Bruck
plan in November of 1849 and made it quit clear that while Prussia was open
to reducing smuggling and cooperation in coinage, railways, postal
arrangement, it rejected as impractical any proposal to set up an Austro-
German customs union. The practical differences between the commercial
areas were too great to overcome.2 This struggle was to become more
pressing as the existing Zollverein treaties were to become obsolete in 1852
and needed to be renewed. At the Zollverein conference in Hesse-Cassel the
Bavarian delegation in collaboration with Austria broached the topic of the
Austro-German trade union. It was decided that Prussia, Saxony and Bavaria
would negotiate on the behalf of the Zollverein with Austria. The
immediate consequences politically for both Austria and Prussia were
immense. For Austria to allow the Zollverein to exist as it did was to insure
Prussian dominance in German national economic questions for the
foreseeable future. 3 Success of the Bruck plan would have meant
mediatization for Prussia. Prussia responded by stalling for time on the issue
and took the approach that an Austrian failure to achieve its goals would be a
Prussian victory. In accepting the call to further conferences in late February
1850 it expressed "volle Zustimmung ... im Allgemeinen."4 There, however,
remained numerous open questions which would have to be resolved such a
1Ibid., 208.
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the new composition and organization of the tariff commission, the setting of
new tariff rates and the borders of the new tariff area. Such issues Prussia
illusively relegated as being secondary to the overall goals, while in fact these
were the nuts and bolts of achieving a new economic union. Prussia also
sought to make any agreement dependent on the unanimous acceptance of
all states involved which created enough opportunities to drag the conference
on indefinitely. While Prussia needed to thwart Austria's power move, it
also needed to avoid losing favor in public opinion for blocking progress
towards greater German economic unity.l While bogging the attempted
union down in the immense details of reconciling the many different
interests and needs, Delbriick also had the task of keeping the conferences a
purely commercially oriented discussions and avoiding any link to the
overall political struggle. He was to insist that it was not a federal issue, but
rather a series of separate commercial treaties between individual states.
Extending the conferences over a period of time benefitted Prussia which had
already tied the medium states' material interests to itself through the
Zollverein. 2 Austria on the other hand exploited its favorable political
position and played on the fears of the southern and medium states of
Prussian hegemonial aims and often mentioned, "Siiddeutschen mogen es
nicht iiberhoren, wie man in Berlin thut, als ob Deutschland bereits in
Preussen aufgegangen ware."3 The Austrian cabinet recognized that:
Ein solcher Weg, die osterreichischen Interessen zu fOrdern, ware es,
wenn man durch die Presse mit allem Eifer in den zwei Richtungen
auf die offentliche Meinung wirkenliesse, dass die preussische
1Lange, offentliche Meinung, 7-8.
2Boehme, Deutschlands Weg,26.
3Ibid.,26.
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Bestrebungen in ihrm wahren Lichte als nur auf den eigenen Vorteil
berechnet, dargestellt, und anderseits die Gemainniitzigkeit der
osterreichischen VorschEige und die ernstliche Absichte ihrer
Durchfiihrung nachgewiesen wiirden.1
While Austria had a great deal of support in the German press,
especially in the south, Prussia in the initial stages of the conflict was left with
only the Prussian press to make its case. Delbriick began to use the Prussian
press to trumpet the cause of the Zollverein with the encouragement of
Manteuffel. In addition to this a number of schwarz-weiss political
economists and intellectuals began to assert that the national system of
economy proposed by Friedrich List overlooked the intrinsic disparities in
interest which existed between the regions of Germany based on varying
nationality, religion, education, geographic situation, and political tradition.2
Though Austria was in a very good position politically, it did not have the
unreserved support of the small and medium states which sought to enhance
their position by exploiting the rift between the two major German powers.
These states were in reality beginning to fear the consequences for their own
integrity if Austria became too dominant in German affairs.3 This and the
complete rejection on the part of Prussia of any expansion in Federal Diet
authority led to a deadlock in Frankfurt. The greatest potential for Austrian
aims in achieving its goals politically lay with the breaching of the
Zollverein.
In an effort to end its isolation and counter Austria's pressure on the
Zollverein. Prussia secretly pursued a free trade agreement with Hannover.
1Lange, offentliche Meinung, 11.
2Ibid., 13ff.
3Boehme, Deutschlands Weg, 35£.
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Prussia agreed to a tariff treaty in September 1851 which adhered to free trade
principles and granted some beneficial terms for Hannover. It thus secured
the adhesion of its natural "economic allies" as the regions smaller
dependent states quickly joined. Prussia was able through this to secure its
economic position in northern Germany.l It controlled access to the North
Sea and the low tariffs precluded the entrance of Austria. Having secured this
much, Prussia took a "take it or leave it" approach with the southern states
concerning the re-establishment of the Zollverein and sent out a circular to
Zollverein states renouncing the existing treaties and demanding for their
renewal the acceptance of the modifications in the Hannover-Prussia treaty.
The circular called for a conference to be held in the early part of 1852 in
Berlin and left the remaining states with the choice of joining or getting the
best deal they could with Austria.2 At this conference Prussia reiterated its
resistance to any plans of including Austria in to the Zollverein and played its
strongest card in insisting that the tariff issue would have to be settled first,
again insisting on the new tariff agreement with Hannover.3 As a
concession, however, it affirmed its willingness to establish a trade agreement
with Austria as a favored trade partner. Prussia in dealing with the southern
states in this manner made clear the dependence of these states economically
on the Zollverein. Saxony, for example, was a state immensely dependent on
the Zollverein and without it many saw Leipzig as being little more than a
village in terms of economic significance.4 Even the protectionist sentiments
of many of the southern states were not enough to surmount the clear
1Ibid., 34ff.
2Henderson, Zollverein, 216.
3Ibid., 219.
4Lange, offentliche Meinung, 33.
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dependency which they felt towards the Zollverein. Those in industry and
trade flooded the courts of these states with petitions to maintain the
Zollverein'! Manufacturers were dismayed that a source of commercial
prosperity could be disbanded and governments which had been receiving a
great deal of revenue from duties began to question the wisdom of breaking
with Prussia.2 Thus, while politically inclined to support Austria, the
material interests of these states lay in economic union with Prussia.
Bismarck, in expressing his opinion concerning the Zollverein conflict,
believed that the Prussian government should not let on as if the Zollverein
was so very important and that Prussia should let the medium states sweat it
out a bit until they recognized their need for their neighbor to the north.3 In
suggesting such a path of action he saw clearly the issue of material interests
and the material dependency of the medium states on Prussia.
Austria sought to come to terms with Prussia on commercial issues
and get the best deal it could seeing that it could not hope to achieve its goal
of breaking open the Zollverein. In December 1852 Prussia and Austria
began negotiating a commercial treaty which was finalized in February 1853.
It was to be a part of the coming Zollverein treaty between Prussia and the
other states. Austria received special trade status as a separate country with
commitments to facilitate transportation, currency circulation, and commerce
with the German trade area. This status was to last for 12 years with
reconsideration of an Austro-German trade agreement in 1860. With these
obstacle out of the way Prussia was able to reestablish its economic union
1Ibid., 33£H.
2Henderson, Zollverein, 221.
3Poschinger, Dr. Ritter von, ed., Pressen im Bundestag, (Osnabruck: Otto Zeller, 1965) 58, 112.
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under the new free trade agreement with all of the previous members and
the addition of Hannover. Viewed in its long term consequences for the
German national question it was a victory of perhaps more significance than
that which Austria had achieved at Olmiitz. Count Buol, the successor of
Schwarzenberg after his sudden death in April 1852, summarized the
situation well: Prussia could return to the Federal Diet where it could hope to
assert its power and position even against a majority and it would be able to
continue binding the medium and small states to intself through material
interests. While an Austro-German trade agreement would have meant the
mediatization of Prussia, the inability of Austria to achieve this left Prussia
with the leverage which the material dependence of the small and medium
states on the Zollverein created and this would be the needed counterbalance
against Austria's political position in the Federal Diet,l
Bismarck's Conservative Compromise
Bismarck during the reaction and subsequent political struggle gained
the recognition as being a capable politician of arch-conservative ideology in
both questions of foreign and domestic policy and his activities during the
Revolution of 1848 in fighting for conservative interest had brought him into
the political circle of the Gerlach brothers and the Camarilla. He was elected
to the Lower House of the Prussian Diet in July 1849 under the new
conservative constitution decreed in 1849. It was clear already, however, in
1Boehme, Deutschlands Weg, 42.
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1849 and 1850 that his speeches against the revolution, his opposition to the
Radowitz plan and his defense of the Olmutz compromise had at their roots a
very different motivation than that of his arch-conservative proteges.
On September 6, 1849 Bismarck delivered a speech which showed him
capable of going beyond his reactionary firebrand reputation, and he gained
the reputation of a politician "who knew how to marshal arguments ... in an
attitude of sober realism ..., a man who thought in terms of alternatives and
made room for different positions."l While criticizing the government's
union plans and attacking its connection to the revolution, he meticulously
appealed to sentiments of Prussian nationalism and pride in a way that sugar
coated the criticism and made it palatable to king and government. He
believed the union plan would give up certain elements of Prussian
sovereignty in that the "ehrenvollesten und wichtigesten Rechte der
presussischen Kammern wuerden auf das Reichsparlament uebergehen," and
Prussia would in turn receive merely the executive "Reichvorstandschaft."
How would Prussian politicians justify this before Prussian voters?2 Such
unification plans, according to Bismarck, stemmed from the roots of the
Frankfurt revolution and sought the mediatization of Prussia through its
absorption into Germany. The imperial crown of Germany could only be
made by melting down the Prussian crown first according to Bismarck.3
Bismarck viewed the king's "romantic ideals" of German unity as being
exploited and saw the union plan as merely a disguised form of what had
been proposed only a year earlier. Radowitz had fallen under the spell of the
1Gall, Bismarck, 72.
2Bismarck, Reden, I, 110.
3Ibid., 81-93.
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"Frankfurt swindle."l Unification of Germany, according to Bismarck,
should be carried out in the glorious tradition of Friedrich the Great and not
through the "Frankfurt hoax," which had its base of support in the
exploitation of social issues. A true national policy:
Waere auf wenige, aber allerdings hervorragende Manner in engeren
Kreisen beschrankt geblieben, wenn nicht dadurch der Boden unter
unseren Fuessen erchiittert wurde.2
Friedrich the Great, according to Bismarck, would not have pursued national
aims on any basis other than the desire to expand Prussian power and:
Es haette ihm freigestanden, mit demselben Recht, mite dem er
Schlesien eroberte, nach Ablehnung der Frankfurter Kaiserkrone den
Deutschen zu befehlen, welches ihre Verfassung sein sollte, auf die
Gefahr hin, das Schwert in die Waagschalle zu werfen.3
He would have taken the role of leader in German affairs and would not
have allowed the Austrian "Kaiser" to take it over through Russian
influence. Bismarck again makes clear his bias concerning the basis of
Prussian strength. Friedrich would not have ruled on the basis of a
constitution and popular support. He would have turned to the:
Stockpreussentum, der die Revoltuion iiberdauert hatte, die
preussische Armee, der preussische Schatz, die Friichte langjargier
intelligenter preussichser Verwaltung und die lebendige
Wechselwirkung, die in Preussen zwischen Konig und Yolk besteht.4
While Bismarck clearly attacked any change in the basic tradition of the
Prussian political structure in a liberalizing direction, he clearly did not
oppose the Prussian union plan out of a desire for rapprochement with
lSchoeps,Hans Joachim, Bismarck iiber Zeitgenossen, Zeitgenossen iiber Bismarck,
(Frankfurt/Main: Verlag Ullstein GmbH, 1972) 158-16l.
2Bismarck, Reden, 11l.
3Ibid., 112.
4Ibid., 113.
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Austria based on the desire for conservative solidarity. While suppressing
the Revolution, Prussia should have done so in a way which increased its
power and prestige as a state. Bismarck's patriotism was Schwarz-Weiss.
German unity in itself was not a goal of Bismarck's at this time and in Erfurt,
at the union parliament in April 1850, Bismarck made it clear that he would
rather not have German unity at all at the price of Prussian sovereignty or a
loss of Prussian dominance in German affairs. He opposed any union plan
which would subject the will of the Hollenzollern dynasty to the will of other
state governments and attacked a system in which:
In dem Fiirstenrath eine Million Badener so schwer wiegen, wie
sechszehn Millionen Preussen, dass ... vier Preussen noethig sind, urn
den Einfluss eines Badeners resp. Nassauers aufzuwiegen.1
The 16 million Prussians could not sacrifice any sovereignty in order to be
molded into a state with 5 million other Germans in the union plan. For
Bismarck the unconditional primacy of Prussian power interests was the
undeniable driving force in his resistance to the Radowitz plan where:
Wir laufen dort die Gefahr, die erheblichlisten Opfer an unserer Macht
und namentlich an unserer Steuerkraft zu bringen, ohne etwas anders
als eine Vermmenderung unseres Selbststandigkeit zu Gunsten der
kleinen Staaten zu erreichen.2
In a letter to his wife in March 1848, Bismarck expressed the desire to see,
"Alles beim Alten,"3 but this statement is not merely to be understood as the
romantic conservatism of Leopold Gerlach, which sought to turn back the
clock on industrialization. It was was based ratheron a defense of Prussian
interests. Bismarck saw Prussian state power and conservative traditional
1Ibid., 237.
2Bismarck, GW, XIV, 152.
3Ibid., 126.
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interests as being intrinsically tied together. The greatest danger of liberal
reorganization was that it hurt specific Prussian power interests.1 He thus
believed that any expansion in Prussian power would have to be pursued on
a conservative basis and not through concessions to liberal concepts of
legitimacy.
With the repression of the Hungarian rebellion, Bismarck saw the end
of any illusion that the German question would be solved by parliaments and
speeches and stated the belief that they would be decided in the field of
diplomacy and war. He noted that in 1849 "die ganzen deutsche Politik wohl
bald eine andere Wendung geben wird."2 Bismarck saw the basic goals of the
union plan bringing Prussia into direct conflict with Austria. He was to state
in hindsight at the end of his career concerning the errors of the Radowitz
plan and the Erfurt Parliament:
The fundamental error of the Prussian policy of those days was that
people fancied they could attain through publicist, parliamentary, or
diplomatic hypocrisies results which could be had only by war or
readiness for it, by fighting or by readiness to fight; in such shape that
they seemed forced upon our virtuous moderation as a reward for the
oratorical demonstrations of our 'German sentiments.' At a later day
these were known as moral 'conquests;' it was the hope that others
would do for us what we dared not do for ourselves.3
How he would react when this conflict came was determined more by his
desire to protect Prussian power and prestige than by his adherence to
conservative values. On November 22, Bismarck wrote in a letter to his wife
that he had in a conversation with Leopold von Gerlach defended "die
Nothwendigkeit des Krieges unter gewissen Umstaenden(d.h. zu grossen
1Call, Bismarck, 61
2Bismarck, GW, XIV, 135.
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Oesterechischen Impertinenz)."l While Gerlach based his judgments solely
on the legal precedent set by the conservative treaties of 1815, Bismarck could
not accept the danger and insult of 100,000 Austrian and Bavarian troops
resting between Prussia's two halves. Only two days later though, Bismarck
made clear that a war at this juncture would be a "vollstandiger Unsinn,"
which would have required the harnessing of Prussian national sentiments
and create the need to slide considerably to the left politically, leaving that
Stockpreussentum again at the will of the revolution. He also believed that
such a war over the German question at this juncture would have left Prussia
and all of Germany at the will of foreign powers such as Russia and France.2
It was in this "you have to pick your battles" spirit that Bismarck
defended the Olmiitz decision before the Lower House of the Prussian Diet on
December 3, 1850. That Bismarck would be chosen by the conservatives to
defend the tremendously disliked Olmiitz treaty shows that he "was seen as
the natural go-between for he different foreign policy positions within the
conservative camp, as a man who knew how to bring out what those
positions had in common and how to bring positions together."3 This ability
to work between forces, to find the necessary common ground on which a
goal could be pursued, was also a quality which began to separate Bismarck
from the conservative ideology of the Camarilla. Bismarck continued the
theme that the cost of waging war with Austria at this time would have been
alliance with the revolution and German nationalism and thus the
weakening of Prussian power through the weakening of the traditional
1Ibid., 182.
2Ibid., 182.
3Gall, Bismarck, 78.
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order.1 He, however, went in a direction which should have greatly
disturbed his conservative colleagues when he defined in very clear terms
what he believed to be the sole factor in determining the action of the state:
not principle, but self interest. Bismarck answered the rhetorical question,
"Warum fuehren grosse Staaten heutzutage Krieg?/' emphatically with, "der
staatliche Egoismus."2 He very pragmatically pointed out the inopportune
nature of a war in which it would be pitted against two major mainland
European powers with a third greedily waiting on the German border for an
opportunity to pursue its interests. Bismarck decried those who would fight a
"Prinzipienkrieg" when what was at stake was the long term power and
position of the Prussian state and the blood of Prussian soldiers.3
In his later years Bismarck in a moment of reflection while stating the
fact that Prussia had not been ripe yet for the leadership of a united Germany,
expressed the belief that Prussia had actually missed a golden opportunity to
create greater unity around itself in German diplomacy when it chose the
path of diplomacy and the Erfurt Parliament. Bismarck saw Prussia's chance
of expansion in its stalwart conservative institutions and the reliability of its
troops.4 While Bismarck was more than glad to see the demise of the
Prussian union plans, the results of Olmutz were also truly a threat to
Prussian power and European interests. While he was willing to accept the
immediate situation which Prussia faced at OlmUtz, it is doubtful that he was
ever willing to accept the overall political situation as a viable path. It was
Bismarck's defense of the Olmutz decision and his support of the
1Bismarck, Reden, I, 275.
2Ibid., 264.
3Ibid., 278.
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conservative compromise, however, which played a significant role in his
assignment to the Federal Diet in 1852. It was in Frankfurt that it became
absolutely clear that the political ethos of Bismarck and his Prussian
nationalism created a vast gulf between himself and his Prussian colleagues.
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Bismarck in Frankfurt
Federal Politics after Olmiitz
Bismarck's selection to the Federal Diet in Frankfurt was made on the
suggestion of Leopold von Gerlach. Gerlach's recommendation was not
based on Bismarck's political experience, but rather on his proven support as
a conservative ally) Bismarck had won their trust by being an outspoken
enemy of democratic or representative governments, had shown himself to
be a staunch proponent of monarchical authority, had opposed the Prussian
Union plan of Radowitz and had defended the highly unpopular Olmiitz
Treaty. He nonetheless, lacked the political experience which a delegate
would normally have possessed. This was a point of worry for the
government, most notably the king, and a point of ridicule for the press and
Bismarck's political opponents wrote, "Herr von Bismarck-Schonhausen
ware auch dem Ruf gefolgt, eine Fregatte zu kommandieren oder eine
Steinoperation durchzufiihren."2 Bismarck was himself aware of his
inexperience and referred to himself to Gerlach late in 1851 as being Gerlach's
II diplomatischer Saugling und gehorsamster Diener."3 This attitude towards
Gerlach shows clearly Bismarck's recognition of his novice status, but also his
political dependency on the ultra-conservatives in his early political career.
lSchoeps,_Zeitgenossen, 141.
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Conservatives saw in Bismarck someone who would strive to
normalize relations and prevent further confrontation between Austria and
Prussia in the framework of a joint alliance against revolution. They had
recognized the basic fact that preserving the old order and pursuing a
Prussian leadership of Germany were mutually exclusive goals. To pursue
the Prussian union plan or any similar plan would have forced the need for
concessions to the revolution. This thinking was a major impetus behind
their acceptance of the humiliation of Olmiitz.l To the arch-conservatives
the act of unifying the German nation at the expense of legitimate dynasties
was an iniquity. The collaboration between Austria and Prussia, in which
the conservatives saw the basis of civic stability in Central Europe, was
assumed. Such legitimists saw German dualism between Austria and Prussia
as a bulwark against the threat of revolution and liberal government.2 The
arch-conservatives sought to reestablish the "legal" status quo from before the
1848 Revolution. The power struggle resulting from Prussia and Austria's
respective attempts to achieve a dominant position is German affairs,
however, made the cooperation of the past in forming a joint cohesive policy
for Germany impossible.3 The German Confederation of pre- and post
Revolution periods functioned in an intrinsically different manners.
Metternich had until his fall in 1848 dealt with Prussia in a manner of utmost
respect following a policy of: "Erst Verstandigung zwischen Oesterreich und
Preussen, dann Antrag beim Bundestag in Frankfurt."4 Now instead of
1Gall, Bismarck, 107
2Hamerow, Social Foundaitons, 189.
3Meyer, Arnlod Oskar, Bismarcks Kampf mit Osterreich am Bundestag zu Frankfurt, (Berlin:K.
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jointly deciding German affairs in the Prussian and Austrian cabinets, Austria
and Prussia vied for the support of the small and medium states as they
strove to gain the advantage in the Federal Diet.l This situation became
increasingly charged and "je deutlicher die Fronted zwischen den beiden
grossen Gegenspileer sich abzeichneten, je mehr der Bund zum Kampfplatz
wurde."2 The existing political situation favored Austria in the Federal Diet.
In light of the political struggle between Austria and Prussia the survival of
the small and medium states had become increasingly precarious in
Germany. The threat which the Prussian union plan had posed to the
independence of these states made clear the risk which existed if either
Austria or Prussia succeed in their desire for primacy in German affairs. The
Federal Diet and German Confederation had been the traditional means by
which the medium and smaller states had pursued their cause of
independence. They therefore sought earnestly to protect it as an institution
because it provided for the legal basis of their independence, even if in fact
they still remained at the mercy and will of the two larger German powers. In
the midst of the open breach between Austria and Prussia, the medium and
small states were naturally drawn to Austria, which promoted the
preservation of the Federal Diet and had been a traditional supporter of the
conservative status quo preserving the integrity of the smaller states and their
particularistic aims. It was believed in German politics that Prussia's desire to
expand could only be fulfilled at the cost of its weaker neighbors while
Austria's natural region of expansion was considered to be in the East.
1Ibid., 21.
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Prussia's union plans had made these political relations exceedingly clear.
The tendency to support Austria did not go so far as Vienna would have
hoped, however. The smaller states were not willing to exchange Prussian
domination for the same conditions under Austria, but sought ultimately to
preserve and enhance their own independence. Thus, neither Austria nor
Prussia could count totally on the support of these states in the Federal Diet)
The issues taken up at Dresden: expansion of the Federal Diet's
authority through the use of majority decisions on major federal decisions
and the issue of Austrian and Prussian parity, had been left open to be further
decided in Frankfurt. Following Olmiitz the necessary policy for Prussia was
to give up pursuing its German union plans and once again rule Germany in
unity with Austria. This meant, however, that they expected concessions on
the part of Austria in achieving an equal relationship in German affairs.2
This was not forthcoming as it was Austria's undeniable goal to expand the
apparatus of the Federal Diet to an executive institution under the Austrian
presidential power at the cost of Prussian influence. In face of the existing
political relations, the political environment which Bismarck was thrust into
in Frankfurt was decidedly anti-Prussian. Whereas this diplomatic post prior
to 1848 had been relatively minor with all major decisions being made in
Berlin or Vienna, Austria's attempt to expand its own power through the
Federal Diet and Prussia's opposition to any move in this direction coupled
with the need to gain support from the medium and small states meant that
the Frankfurt delegation had become a key diplomatic position.3 The key
1Fuchs, Die deutsche Mittelstaaten, 1-8.
2Meyer, Kampf, 35.
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aims of Austria: to lower the necessity of unanimity in the Federal Diet to
majority vote on questions of significance, and to increase delegate
independence, which would have increased the independence and prestige of
the body itself, brought the Federal Diet diplomatic position into a new
spotlight. The fact remains, however, that Bismarck functioned as a tool in
Frankfurt with most important decisions of overall policy already made for
him and not as a shaper of Prussian politics.! Bismarck, not willing to accept
this fate, made up for the secondary nature of his position by writing
profusely of his work and opinions to his political superiors and friends. It is
from these writings in the form of official reports and letters to friends and
family which one can gain insight into Bismarck and his political philosophy
and how this determined his attitude towards Austria.
Bismarck's Political Hardening
Concerning the goals of Austria, Bismarck noted that it sought, "[die]
Beteiligung des Bundes als politischer Einheit im internationalen Verkehr,"
and that in an effort to achieve this they would attempt, "die Action Preussen
nach aussen durch die des Bundes zu absorbiren und die Vertretung des
letztern durch die Priisidialmacht mehr und mehr auszubilden."2 If Austria
were successful in its attempt to create "ein verHingertes Osterreich" in the
German Federal Diet, "so waren die Lebensadern Preussens als europiiische
IGall, Bismarck, 103.
2Bismarck, GW, I, 155.
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Grossmacht unterbunden."l Austria had left the issues of Dresden to be
solved in Frankfurt and Bismarck was to write shortly after his arrival,
"Osterreich ist der MajorWit zu sicher, urn sich auf Vershindigung mit
Preussen einzulassen."2 Through these attempts and the Zollverein conflict
Austria sought to rein in Prussia's foreign influence and at the same time
break the material hold which Prussia had developed over its smaller
neighbors. While the question of nationalistic sentiments and popular
support in Germany prevented Prussia from outright rejecting forever the
idea of German economic unity or greater political solidarity through the
Federal Diet as Austria conceived it, both Manteuffel and Bismarck knew that
these possibilites were unacceptable in terms of Prussian power and prestige.3
Bismarck's basic political philosophy was clarified from 1851 to 1853.
When he first arrived at Frankfurt his basic political assumptions were bases
on, "Prussian national interests conceived in terms of the unassailable
legitimacy of monarchical rule and a commitment to the traditional order."4
This was made clear by the position which he took on the Olmutz crisis and
his activities during the revolution. Leopold von Gerlach and the
conservatives who propelled Bismarck into office viewed his mandate in
Frankfurt as promoting the throne against, "die rote Flut," and seeking to
create "eine Stiitte bruderlicher Zusammenwirkens der Konservativen
Regierungen Preussens und Osterreichs."5 Bismarck in writing to
Manteuffel, summarized his mandate in Frankfurt as being:
1Meyer, Kampf, 66.
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Die Beziehungen beider Cabinette so freundlich als moglich zu
gestalten, ohne in der Zollsache etwas nachzugeben, unnothige
Spannungen zu heben und die Bedeutung der Zollfrage und der
Divergenz in derselben nicht mehr als nothig wachsen und auf andre
Fragen und auf die allgemeinen Beziehungen beider Machte Einfluss
gewinnen zu lassen." I
He was to exact from Austria full recognition of Prussia's equality of status in
the Confederation while seeking to thwart Austria's main political attempts
to expand the power of the Federal Diet and enter the Zollverein, all the
while avoiding conflict if at all possible. The tension in pursuing such
contradictory mandates put Bismarck in a situation where he was forced to
choose between ultra-conservative values or Prussian state interests and this
shed a great deal of light on his political assumptions. During the struggle
over Olmutz he had already made clear that he viewed politics in terms of
national interests and not bonds of sentiment or romantic views of
conservative fraternity. He had been quit willing, given the right conditions,
to fight Austria. In Frankfurt Bismarck's willingness to sacrifice solidarity
with Austria to Prussian political goals earned him the reputation of being a
bitter opponent of Austrian politics and called into question the nature of his
conservativism. It was to eventually cost him the friendship of Leopold von
Gerlach.
Bismarck's development as a politician in this atmosphere in
Frankfurt and his attitude towards Austria can be most clearly seen in his
attitude towards the routine business and politics of the Federal Diet and his
personal relationship to the Austrian delegation. Prussia faced the initial
problem of breaking the overwhelming majority against itself or achieving
1Bismarck, GW, I, 207.
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parity with Austria. Bismarck pointed out already in 1851 that "im Fall einer
etwaigen Divergenz zwischen Oesterreich und Preussen ist die MajorWit der
Bundesversammlung bei der jetzigen Sachlage fiir Oesterrecih gesichert," and
further that Austria would use "die MajorWit, in welcher es sich im
Bundestage befindet, ohne Rucksicht auf die formellen Garantien der
MinorWit, ausbeuten."1 Bismarck did not enter Frankfurt as an opponent to
Austria, but his ideological underpinnings from the start turned him into
such when faced with these goals and attitudes towards Prussia. It was at the
start Bismarck's desire that the power struggle between Austria and Prussia be
settled in a peaceful and cooperative manner and he wrote to Gerlach:
Es ist fiir jeden angenehmer, seinen Dienst in Frieden thun zu
konnen, aber es ist nur das Wiener Cabinet selbst, welches dem
Vertreter Preussens die unwillkommene Pflicht auferlegt, in
fortwahrend wachsamer Opposition offnen und verdeckten
Ubergriffen in der Bundespolitik entgegen zu treten. Ich war Gewiss
kein principieller Gegner Ostreichs, als ich herkam vor 4 Jahren, aber
ich hatte jeden Tropfen Preussischen Blutes verlaugnen miissen, wenn
ich mir eine auch nur massige Vorliebe fiir das Ostreichs, wie seine
gegenwartigen Machthaber es verstehen, hatte bewahren wollen.2
Bismarck stated to Gerlach later concerning his hardening towards Austria:
"Ich war ziemlich gut Oestreichisch, als ich herkam," but this is quickly
qualified, "und ich bin auch bereit, es wieder to sein, wenn wir von dort die
Garantie fiir eine Politik erhalten, bei der auch wir bestehen konnen."3 It is
fair to say from these statements that he honestly sought to pursue his
directive of rapprochement and that he did not enter Frankfurt as a
determined opponent of Austria. This is further exemplified by his initial
1 G W, I, 113£.
2GW, II, 23; Poschinger, Preussen im Bundestag, 180.
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attempt in Frankfurt to work out difficulties behind closed doors with Thun
in order to maintain the appearance of unity despite the conflict which
existed. Bismarck noted concerning the need for the appearance of unity in
the Federal Diet:
Die Personlichkeit des Grafen Thun, und die Notwendigkeit, am
Budnestage den andern Gesandeten gegeniiber den Eindruck der
vollsten Ubereinstimmung Preussens und Osterreichs festzuhalten und
zu verstarken, lassen mir es nicht ratsam erscheinen, dem Grafen Thun
gegeniiber eine politische Verstimmung iiber die Haltung Osterreichs an
den Tag zu legen. ... Ich vermeide daher meinerseits dem Grafen Thun
gegeniiber geflissentlich jede Erorterung iiber Fragen, deren
Entscheidung von uns beiden nicht abhangt, und deren Besprechung,
ohne Vorteil fUr die Sache selbst, auf unser bisher sehr gute personliches
Eivernehmen riickwirken konnte.l
It was Bismarck's expectation that through close cooperation between
himself and the Austrian delegate, a true front of conservative solidarity
could be achieved, but he came to the conclusion from the unwillingness of
Thun to participate in such a mutual relationship that "Graf Thun bemiiht
ist, die Prasidialbefugnisse, gestiitzt auf Besitz und factisches Ubergreifen,
ungebiihrlich zu erweitern."2 Even on such small issues as the placement of
federal troops for the protection of the Federal Diet, the Prussian and
Austrian delegates were unable to reach an agreement behind closed doors
which they could then present to the Federal Diet and Bismarck was left with
the complaint that Thun pushed a decision through the Federal Diet which
did not consider Prussian wishes.3
lIbid., 97.
2Ibid.~ 39£.
3Ibid., 51.
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All efforts of rapprochement could only end in futility considering the nature
of the power struggle which existed between the two states and Bismarck's
poltical assumptions. Bismarck believed that Thun, while hiding behind the
guise of legitimacy and conservative rapprochement, did not pursue such an
agenda in the spirit. Concerning the anti-Prussian sentiments of his Austrian
colleagues, Bismarck wrote to Manteuffel:
Insoweit letzeres der Fall sein sollte, erlaube ich mir E. E. haherem
Ermessen die Frage zu geneigter Erwagung ehrerbietigst zu
unterstellen, ob es nicht gerade im Interesse der Befestigung und der
Dauer des guten Einvernehmens zwischen beiden Machten
angemessen sein machte, wenn E. E. die Geneigthiet hatten, dem
Fiirsten Schwarzenberg bei sich darbietender Gelegenheit die
Bedingungen einer g e g ens e i t i g e n Riicksichtnahme und
Farderung der Interessen zu vergegenwartigen, unter welchem allein
ein in demselben Grade wie bisher bundesfreundliche
Entgengkommen Preussens auf die Dauer durchfiihrbar sien kann.l
Despite the existing poltical conditions in Frankfurt, Bismarck's mandate
remained the same. This he deemed not possible if Austria were to hold to
the need for conservative rapprochement only in the letter of the law while it
pursued its own power political interests at the cost of Prussian sovereignty
and independence. Concerning the state of federal politics and Prussia's
resistance to Austrian aims, Bismarck wrote Manteuffel of a conversation
with a Federal Diet delegate in which he expressed the opinion:
Nach der bestehenden Bundesverfassung die Stellung Preussens mir
allerdings nicht in dem Grade gesichert und den natiirlichen
Machtverhaltnissen meines Vaterlandes intsprechend erscheine, dass
Preussen nicht Veranlassung hatte, jeden Schritt, der zu einer
Starkung der Bundesgewalt auf Kosten der territorialen
Unabhangigkeit fiihren kanne, sorgfaltig zu priifen; ausserdem sei die
Baltung der Majoritat des Bundestages ... der preussichen Politik
gegeniiber von der Art, dass Preussen darin keine Aufforderung
lIbid., 97.
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erblicken kanne, in die Hande dieser Majoritat einen starkeren wie den
bisherigien Einfluss auf die Entschliessungen seiner Regierung zu
legen.1
Because of these conditions, Bismarck from a very early period in Frankfurt
began to show great skepticism about German politics in Frankfurt as a whole
and towards his Austrian colleague Count von Thun and his government's
politics in particular. He wrote to Manteuffel:
Meine Earwartungen von den Resultaten der Bundesverhandlungen
waren nich hoch als ich herkam, aber sie haben sich seitdem
vermindert. .... Eine richtige wurdigung der gemeinsamen Interessen
der deutschen Regirungen und der dadurch bedingten Nothwendigkeit
des Anschlusses an und der Unterordnung unter einander ist hier
sowenig vorhanden, dass der Bundestag eher ein Bild des Bellum
omnium contra omnes [ ] bei genauer Prufung bietet, als
das einer Verbindung zu anerkannt gemeinsamen Zwecken.2
He was appalled by the "w ichtigthuender Kleinigkeitskramerei" and constant
suspicion which permeated the Federal Diet member towards each other and
in a further scathing critic of the political atmosphere in Frankfurt wrote,
"Kein Mensch selbst der baswilligste Zweifler von Demokrat, glaubt es, was
fUr Charlatanerie und Wichtigthurei un dieser Diplomatie steckt."3 He not
only questioned the validity of the politics in Frankfurt, he questioned the
overall claim that the Federal Diet represented conservative interests and
values or law. He wrote very early on in his delegation concerning the
Austrians and
the Federal Diet:
Die idee die Entscheidung des Bundes anzurufen finde ich unwurdig.
Die Oestreicher sind und bleiben falsche Spieler, und ich glaube nicht,
lew, I, 98.
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das wir mit ihrem masslosen Ehrgeiz und mit ihren von jedem
Rechtbegriff baren innen und aussern Politik jemals zu einem
aufrichtigem Bund mit ihnen gelangen; sie reserviren sich stets das
Lowentheil und fiihren die Einigkeit nur dann im Munde, wenn es
ihre Zwecke oder die Vereitlung der unsrigen gilt; wenigstens so longe
Schwarzenberg Minister ist, hoffe ich auf keine bessere Einsicht bei
ihnen.1
It was clear to Bismarck at this time that "Oestreich misbraucht den Bund und
nutzt ihn dadurch ab, er solI Mittel sein, unsern Einfluss in Deutschland zu
neutralisiern."2 This perception of Austria as a threat to Prussian interests
doomed his attempts at rapprochement to failure and led him into a bitter
conflict with Thun and with Thun's successors.
Bismarck's Relationship to Thun
Bismarck's initial encounter with Graf von Thun and their mutual
appraisals of one another, while very biased, show further Bismarck's
growing skepticism and his increasing opposition to Austria. At a personal
level Bismarck initially assessed Thun with the critical observation:
Er tragt in seniem Aussern etwas von bursichikosem Wesen zur Schau,
gemischt mit einem Anflug von Wiener Roue'. Die Sunden, die er in
letzter Eigenschaft begehen mag, sucht er durch strenge Beobachtung der
Vorschriften der katholischen Kirche in seinen oder doch in den Augen
der Grafin aufzuwiegen. Er spielt auf dem Club bis 4 Uhr morgens
Hazard, ... tanzt von 10 bis 5 Uhr ohne Pause und mit sichtlicher
Leidenschaft, geniesst dabei reichlich kalten Champagner.
Beyond Bismarck's uncomplimentary personal opinion of Thun, however, was
a definite awareness for the political capabilities of his opponent, though even
lIbido, 231.
2Ibido, 3270
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these considerations could be summed up with the word sneaky, and Bismarck
stated:
Unter dieser dieser ausserlichen Richtung ... birgt Graf Thun, ich will
nicht sagen eine hohe politische Thatkraft und geistige Begambung, aber
doch einen ungewahnlichen Grad von Schlauheit und Berechnung, die
mit grosser Geistesgegewart aus der Maske harmloser Bonhomie
hervortritt, sobaid die Politik ins Spiel kommt. ... Wie ich hare, ist
Graf Thun, . .. gewissenhaft bemiiht, das treuste Organ der der absichten
des Fiirsten Schwarzenberg zu sein.l
The most significant observation of Bismarck concerning Thun at this time
was that Thun functioned merely as the voice of Schwarzenberg in Frankfurt
and was in complete support of the Schwarzenberg policy of seeking to
subjugate Prussia in German affairs.2 He in so describing the Austrian
delegation was making clear the sharp discrepancy between Schwarzenberg's
politics of power and self interest and their alleged politics of conservative
unity, law and principle. Bismarck soon began to characterize his
observations of moral hypocrisy and two facedness which he saw in Thun as
being specific to the Austrian diplomats and to their political aims as a
whole.3 He wrote concerning this Austrian double moral standard:
Die Oestterreicher sind intriguant unter der Maske burschikoser
Bonhomie, verlegen, stehlen Acten (selbst die Rechtlisten unter
ihnen), spielen, huren und suchen uns bei kleiner Formalien zu
iibertapeln.4
Bismarck's assessment of Austrian delegates and the moralizing undertones
should not be taken too seriously. Such caricatures are especially prevalent
in his letters to Gerlach who sought to make conservative German solidarity
lew, I, 3fi Meyer, Bismarck's Kampf, 38-40.
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the basis of Prussian politics.1 At the heart of Bismarck's personal opposition
to Thun was Thun's commitment to Austrian primacy in German politics.2
Bismarck, in a report to Manteuffel, makes record of a personal conversation
with Thun wherein Thun expressed Schwarzenberg's belief:
Dass Deutschalnd machtig und gHicklich sein werde, wenn Preussen
zum Verstandniss seiner historichen Aufgabe gelange; diese bestehe
nicht darin, dass es mit Ostreich um den diesem gebuhrenden ersten
Platz hadere, sondern dass es den ubrigen deutschen Staaten Schutz
und Garantie gegen etwaige LTbergriffe Ostreichs biete.3
Such a position in German affairs would have completely undone the legacy
of Friedrich the Great in establishing Prussia as a major power in Germany
and Europe as a whole. Such statements give a clear perspective of the issues
which were at stake in the conflict which existed in Frankfurt.
Thun, likewise, had immediately mistrusted the Prussians in the
Federal Diet and saw them as a threat to Austria's effort for primacy in
Central Europe. Thun often criticized Bismarck for what he considered over
sensitivity to affront and his lack of understanding for protocol. While this
was likely in part true, the overall political nature of such a conflict rooted in
the issue of Prussian and Austrian parity should not be overlooked in the
personal dislike Thun had for Bismarck.4 More significant is Thun's report
to his superior in September 1851, in which he accused Bismarck of being
concerned singularly with the interests of Prussia and having little faith in
the work of he Federal Diet.s
1Gall, Bismarck, 105.
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The personal struggle over etiquette and formalities was a consequence
of the overall power struggle and "urn die ParWit geltend zu machen,"
Bismarck matched this informality or the affronts of his Austrian colleague.!
He sought to challenge every formality and informality which even hinted of
Austrian privilege. This led him into a "Kleinkrieg der Nadelstiche" with
Thun concerning "ganz unwesentliche Dinge."2 If Thun received Bismarck
in a summer shirt, Bismarck would pull of his Jacket. If Thun left Bismarck
waiting for an appointment, Bismarck would walk out. If Thun took
advantage of his smoking privilege in the Federal Diet, Bismarck would ask
him for a light. This was clearly more than a personal conflict between the
two individuals. It was a part of Bismarck's overall policy of opposition to
any measures or privilege which increased or accentuated Austria's dominant
position in the Federal Diet.
The personal struggle over protocol and etiquette between the two
delegates reached into the political activities of the Federal Diet and the
conflict played itself out in the larger realm of German politics. Despite
Prussia being able to break its complete isolation following the Olmiitz defeat
by closing a free trade agreement with Hannover in late 1851, the struggle
over the Zollverein was far from resolved. Prussia still felt itself to be much
on the defensive and Thun himself believed that the saber rattling and
opposition of Bismarck was merely a reaction to what he considered Austria's
imminent success in breaching the Zollverein. Bismarck's antics as far as he
was concerned were a last gasp effort to avoid inevitable subjugation of
1 Meyer, Bismarcks Kampf, 42.
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Prussia in German affairs and thus also European affairs} Thun saw clearly
that Prussia put little faith in the Federal Diet and wrote to Schwarzenberg:
"Die preussische Politik steht auf dem Standpunkt der negativen
Handlungsweise," and further that Bismarck reflected this. It became clear to
Thun concerning Bismarck, "Er geht von der Dberzeugung aus, dass hier
nichts zu machen sei."2 In a classic conversation in November 1851
concerning the basic issues of equality in the Federal Diet and inclusion of
Austria in the Zollverein, Bismarck and Thun clearly laid bare the issues
which were at stake for both states. Thun referred to Prussia as an anomaly in
German affairs achieved by the wild gambling of Friedrich the Great to which
Bismarck replied that if Austria did not change its political course, Prussia
would be forced to do so again.3 According to Thun, Austria had always
played the leadership role in German affairs and could only share this role
with Prussia if the old particularistic differences were put aside and further
stated that: "Solange das gegenseitige Verhaltniss nicht frei von
partikularistischer Eifersucht sei, konne das jetzige gute Einvernehmen nicht
ein Frieden, sonder nur ein Waffenstillstand genannt werden."4 Bismarck,
replying that the Reformation and its political consequences were a fact which
could not be changed, rejected fully the idea that Prussia could or would deny
"[die] Erbschaft Friedrichs des Grossen." To do so would destroy Prussian
prestige and deny it a rightful position as a European power, und "ehe [er] ...
zu einer derartigien Politik zu Hause riethe, wiirde die Entscheidung durch
1Meyer, Bismarcks Kampf, 71.
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den Degen vorhergehn mussen."l Thun likened such political thinking to a
man, "der einmal das Loos von 100,000 Thlr. gewonnen hat und nun seinem
Haushalt auf die jahrliche Wiederkehr dieses Ereignisses einrichte."
Bismarck made it clear, "wenn diese Ansichten in Wien so klar waren wie bei
ihm[Thun], so sahe ich keine allerdings voraus, dass Preussen nochmals in
der bewussten Lotterie werde setzen mussen."2 It is clear from such
comments that Bismarck had taken an aggressive stance to Austria and that
rapprochement would not be achieved unless there was a significant change
in power relations between the two states. His willingness to pursue
rapprochement depended on the basic issue of achieving parity in German
affairs and securing Prussia its rightful position as a European power which it
had achieved under Friedrich the Great.3 In response to Austria's continued
attempt to either enter or break up the Zollverein and to increase the power
of the Federal Diet, Bismarck threatened Prussian withdrawal from the
German federation.4 Thun records that Bismarck replied to Austria's
continued effort to break Prussia:
50 hielte die schwache 5chale (der Bundesverfassung) es nicht aus und
Preussen bliebe es nichts ubrig als sich von allem zuruckzuziehen und,
wie der Konig stets sage, zu warten, bis der Zeitpunkt kommt, wo
Deustschalnd WhIt, das es Preussen brauche.5
The willingness by the Prussian government to follow through with such a
threat was evident in a similar threat by Manteuffel to Vienna and it was
1Ibid., 105.
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taken seriously by the Austrian government.l Prussia was willing to go it on
its own rather than be forced into a subservient position to Austria in
Germany. Bismarck himself wrote:
Die directe Verstandigung mit Oestrecih halte ich auch fiir unmoglich.
Die Bedingungen wiirden jedenfalls schlechter fiir uns sein, als die,
welche wir sicher errecihen werden, wenn wir auf die vollstandigste
Isolirung ankommen.2
In all of this Bismarck made clear his unwillingness to hold the conservative
line of politics concerning conservative supranational solidarity under such
conditions. He was willing to pursue such a philosophy of conservative
solidarity only when it served the interests of the Prussian state. That he
served first the Prussian state is made very clear in his reply to Thun's
irritation over Prussia's resistance in resolving the conflict over the Federal
Fleet from 1848, "Meine Aufgabe ist, preussiche Politik, ebenso wie es die
Ihrige ist, ostreichische zu treiben."3 This service to the state entailed that
nothing could be done out of good will rather:
Die Granze, bis zu welcher sie uns entgegenkommen, wird vielmehr
lediglich durch die Vortheile oder Nachteile Bedingt, welche es in
unsrer Macht liegt ihnen versprechen oder anzudrohn. Diese wie ich
glaubeunzweifelhafte disposition doer iibrigen Staaten, einschliesslich
Oesreichs, setzt uns in die Nothwendigkeit, jensietigen Wiinschen
aller nimals aus Gefalligkeit, sonder nur gegen aquivalente
Concessionen zu entsprechenA
It was the threat from the Wiener cabinet and the aggressive policy of Austria
in the Federal Diet which forced Bismarck to take an opposing stance as the
Prussian delegate. Bismarck, as a result of this hardening of fronts between
1Ibid., 72.
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Prussia and Austria began to systematically undermine Austrian political
aims in the Confederation. He blocked or slowed any measures which would
have increased federal power in the decisions and affairs of the individual
states and acted as a persistent gadfly and obstructionist to any action taken
which would threaten Prussia's complete independence whether fiscally, in
the arena of foreign policy, economically, or any other area relevant to
Prussian state sovereignty.
Bismarck's Fight With the Federal Diet: Pressefehde
One of Bismarck's first major successes in undermining Austria's
position was to usurp the Austrian right to make press releases of Federal
Diet affairs, a privilege which had allowed them to influence public opinion.
For Bismarck, the Austrian use of the press to garner for itself German
national opinion was a clear sign of Austria's ill will towards Prussia. That
the Austrian delegation in Frankfurt took such initiative in controlling press
releases of Federal Diet activities in addition to manipulating the pro-
Austrian press as best it could was yet further proof, "wie sehr die
Osterrchische Regierung bemiiht ist, der Bundeskanzlei den Character eines
ausschliesslich Osterreichischen Instituts zu geben."1 The existing organ for
such activities was a committee consisting of Austria and three other Federal
states, Prussia not included. In the existing atmosphere in the Federal Diet
this was clearly not in the interests of Prussia to allow such an organ to
1Pochinger, Preussen im Bundestag, 146£.
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publish with what was inevitably a pro-Austrian bias. Die Pressefehde was
begun soon after Bismarck entered the Federal Diet when in December of 1851
he strongly challenge this Austrian privilege to make press releases of Federal
Diet activities though the traditional Federal Diet organ and proceeded to
publish in the Prussian press his own account of activities.1 He saw this as a
clear means of showing Prussian independence and asserting its parity. The
conflict which had broiled to this point between Prussia and Austria behind
closed doors spilled out onto the Federal Diet floor and eventually became a
war of words which played itself out in brochures and newspapers.2 Bismarck
sought to prevent Austria from using its privilege to make what he viewed as
its own biased press releases of Federal Diet activities in order to influence
the smaller and medium states. He in a memorandum to Manteuffel made
clear the need to influence public opinion in the service of Prussian national
interests and wrote of the need to gain popular support:
[Ich] bin ... schon seit einiger Zeit bemiiht gewesen, die im Siiden fiir
die Erhaltung des Zollvereins iiberall vorhandenen Sypathien zu
shirken und zur Ausserungen anzuregen, urn auf diese Weise eine
Agitation fUr den erwahnten Zweck aus dem Schosse der Bevolkerung
selbst in Leben zu rufen.3
The nature of the conflict was beginning to go beyond the politics of the
Federal Diet and was clearly being waged through newspapers and brochures
throughout Germany as both sides saw the necessity of garnering popular
opinion in Germany in order to achieve their political aims at the level of
Federal and cabinet politics. Bismarck made clear his belief in the need to
defend Prussian interests by portraying a more accurate picture of the political
1Ibid., 48, 67.
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struggle in the press to counteract the pro-Austrian bias which existed in
much of the southern German press and the courts of the Southern states and
stated concerning this propaganda:
Hier werde ich nicht nachlasses ... durch die Presse den wahren
Thatbestand unter vershiedenen Formen und an verschiedenen Orten
ohne aIle Schonungen aufdecken lassen, von der Uberzeugung
geleitet, dass eine langere Riicksicthnahme nur von unserem Ziele
weiter abfiihrt.l
Bismarck often complained of the disadvantage which Prussia found itself at
in terms of press influenced and expressed the wish for access to more widely
distributed newspaper, especially in the southern regions.2 In light of the
attempt by Austria to expand its power through the Federal Diet and the large
majority which it had behind it in this institution, Bismarck believed that it
was necessary, "das Preussische Interesse in Siiddeutschland auf das
Entscheidenste zu vertreten und solche Agitationen zu paralysiren, welche
den wohlbegriindeten Einfluss Preussens auf Siiddeuschland aufzuheben
trachten."3 One of the primary means he saw of achieving this was through
the press. That Prussia would breach such a privilege and offend Federal Diet
etiquette left no doubt in the minds of most delegates that the Prussian stance
towards the expansion of the power of the Federal Diet was one of opposition
and Bismarck was to record: "Unsere Pressfehde wegen der Publikation ...
hat tiefen und schmerzlichen Eindruck gemacht und die Herren etwas zur
Besinnung gebracht." After the shock caused by this breach of etiquette
Bismarck suggested aWaffenstillstand to allow the reality of Federal power
relations to sink in and to avoid hardening the Federal German states against
1Poschinger, Preussen im Bundestag, 38.
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Prussia.1 The Federal Diet and the conservative German states had to this
point disdained the popular opinion in the political arena and that they
would now begin to use popular sentiment to further their own power
political needs in German politics was in Bismarck's mind proof of the
fundamental conflict of interests which existed between the Prussia and
Austria. As a Prussian statesman he was willing to use the power of the press
to manipulate popular opinion even in the face of his conservative
inclination against the press.
Flottenfrage
Shortly after the beginning of the struggle over press releases Prussia
came into conflict with the Federal Diet concerning the Federal Diet's
financial responsibility for the German fleet created during the Revolution of
1848. In the face of the failed revolution there existed numerous questions
concerning whether or not the fleet was Federal property or whether it
should be divided up among the various states of the Confederation which
sought to have a naval presence. The initial conflict arose when the Federal
Diet sought to rewrite the payment schedule of the Federal fleet and its
upkeep without recognizing the previous contribution of Prussia and
without requiring states which had not contributed to carry part of the
financial burden from the past. Prussia had paid more than any other state
for the founding and upkeep of the fleet while Austrian and other smaller
lIbid., 67.
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states had contributed nothing and it protested the rewriting of a new receipt
. until the tardy payments had been made and Prussia's previous larger
contributions were recognized. When the Federal Diet did not take this
protest into account and rewrote the bill anyhow, Prussia claimed that this
was beyond the authority of the Federal Diet. It could only ask for free will
donations from the states of the Confederation and this was not enforceable
by majority decision from the Federal Diet. Prussia in refusing to pay its
contribution for the German fleet created during the Revolution of 1848
denied the Federal Diet any right to make decisions concerning Prussia's fiscal
obligations to any federal projects. Prussia made clear shortly after the conflict
began that it would in the face of certain compromises be willing to pay its
part for the fleet upkeep, the most important of these compromises being the
Federal denial of any right to make further fiscal demands on the individual
states in the Confederation. By the end of the year, 1851, Bismarck saw these
conditions as having been met and was willing to end the Prussian resistance
and holdout on fleet payments, but the attitudes of the Prussian cabinet in
Berlin were beginning to harden against Austria. Manteuffel, in order to
assert Prussian independence and also to make clear the Federal Diet's need
for Prussian involvement, further blocked Prussian payment of the dues.
This refusal created a situation of immense tension in the Federal Diet.
Rather than face federal insolvency over the fleet payments, Thun, using the
future federal income as a guarantee, took out a loan from the Rothschild
Bank to pay for the fleet upkeep, an act which Prussia clearly condemned as
unconstitutional. Prussia proceeded to put a lean on the Bank of Rothschild
making it responsible for any financial losses which would be suffered by
.......... -
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Prussia in the future if it were to make the loan to the Federal Diet.l For
. Bismarck the fate of the fleet was quit secondary to the issue of the Federal
Diets claim have the authority to in any way determine the sovereign affairs
of its members. He saw in this new struggle a chance to undermine the
attempts of the Federal Diet to expand the authority of the Federal Diet and he
wrote to Manteuffel: "Ich bestritt widerholt die Berecthtigung der MajoritiH,
Hir andere Zwecke als organische Bundeseinrichtungen den
Budnesmitgliedern Verplichtungen zu Zahlungen aufzulegen. ff2 Bismarck
in the midst of this opportunity however, also saw the possibility of bringing
the weight of public opinion in Germany against Prussia as the fleet was a
symbol of German unity and power to many who sought greater unity
between the German states. Bismarck was therefore inclined to meet the
Prussian payments for the upkeep of the fleet.3 The conflict over the fleet
thus posed a double challenge to Bismarck as he sought to undermine
Austria and the Federal Diet politically and to prevent any infringement on
Prussian autonomy while at the same time not revealing any lack of zeal for
German unity which would turn public opinion against Prussia. The true
value of the fleet for both Austria and Prussia was not in the ships and
Bismarck noted to Gerlach that if Prussia could resolve the conflict in a
favorable manner "so erreichen wir im Wesentlichen dasselbe Resulatat,
welches wir bei den Verhandlungen mit Hanvoer beabsichteigten und
welches ... unsere Stellung in Deutchland ein erhaebliches Releif verlehin
wird, denn die Plotte hat in den Vorstellungen der offentlichen Meinung
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und namentlich auch der meisten Deutschen Regirungen eine hbhere
Bedeutung als in der Wirklichket." l The significance of the fleet in the
struggle to expand the Federal Diet's power and increase its influence over the
various federal states was in reality considerable and it was necessary that
Prussia not allow Austria to create a precedent from which it could then
make further fiscal demand on federal states through the Federal Diet
machinery. At the high point of this conflict Prussia threatened both from
Berlin and through Bismarck in Frankfurt with Prussian succession from the
Federal Diet if Austria did not end pursuing its efforts to enter the Zollverein
and expand the Federal Diet. The conflict escalated to the point that Russia
was once again called upon to mediate the dispute. This time the Russian
Czar with a new cabinet was not predisposed to Schwarzenberg's attempt to
breach Zollverein and was not supportive of the Austrian foreign minister's
overall political scheme. By taking on the role of referee, unlike in 1850
when he applied pressure on Prussia to accede to Austrian and federal
demands, The Czar lent Prussia the badly needed moral support with which it
could win a compromise in its own favor from Austria.2 In the end the
federal fleet was a point of contention which could not be resolved and
through the mediation of Russia the two powers came to an agreement
disbanding the federal fleet. This was in fact a serious political defeat for
Austria and Thun in the Federal Diet. During this time Prussia was in fact
the object of a great deal of resentment for its role in the fleet's demise, but in
lew, IV, 251.
2Meyer, Bisamrck's Kampf, 87££.
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the long run such a stalemate favored Prussia because the right of the Federal
Diet to impose financial measures on an independent state was denied.l
Censure Law
A most revealing point of contention between Austria and Prussia was
the attempt by the Federal Diet to create a more stringent German wide
censure law. It had been decided in the early phases of the reaction that "die
revolutionare Presse sei im Dienste der Manner des Umsturzes ein Mittel
von so weitgreifenden und verderblicher Wirkung geworden, dass die Ruhe
der Staaten und der Gesellschaft gegen diesen Feind nicht mehr durch das
gewahnliche Strafrecht ausreichend geschiitzt werden kanne."2 Negotiations
for a new federal censure law were begun in late 1851. The Latenbacher plan,
so named after the Austrian negotiator, sought to implement the Prussian
censure laws on a Federal level. Latenbacher sought to give the German
Confederation a censure law for which Prussia had no possible objections, but
which when applied at a federal level would stifle Prussia's use of the press
which it had used in the Pressefehde to criticize the Federal Diet. If the
Prussian law were extended to all German states in the federation with a
system of accountability between the states with stringent directives which
would have made illegal criticisms of the Federal Diet and the individual
states and monarchs, Austria would have won a significant victory in the
1Ibid., 75, 95£.
2Ibid., 104£.
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battle for public opinion.l Prussia had the means to completely stifle its press.
It had left the press, however, just enough freedom to praise its own policy
and used it as a propaganda tool against Austria and the Federal Diet. Austria
hoped to stifle any"Angriffe auf den Bestand des Deutschen Bundes und auf
das Ansehen und die Wurde der obersten Bundesbehorde ... ,
Schmahumgen, Entstellungen und Verspottung der Staatseinrichtungen,
Gesetze, Regierungsfrom und Verwaltungsmassregeln."2 It was the clear
objective of Thun to rein in the Prussian attacks in the press against Austrian
policy and those states which supported it through such a law.3 Giving the
Federal Diet authority on a German wide level concerning the press was
automatically opposed by Bismarck and he wrote Manteuffel in the early
sittings:
Ich glaube voraussetzen zu durfen, dass es ebensowenig in der Absicht
der Allerhochsten Regierung Seiner Majistat des Konigs liegt, der
Bundesversammlung den Erlass eines allgeminen deutschen Bundes-
Pressgesetzes, als ein grundsatzliches Eingreifen in jede, also auch die
Preussische Preesgesetzgebung zu uberlassen.4
According to the Prussian government, "der Bund habe nur das Recht,
moglichtst gleichformige normative Bestimmung gegen den Misbracuh der
Pressefreiheit aufzustellen, und auch das nur im Wege gemeinschaftlichen
Uebereinkunft, d.h. durch Stimmeneinhelligkeit aller Bundesmitglieder."5
In response to the Latenbacher plan Prussia proposed its own plan and
Bismarck wrote:
1Ibid., 106£.
2Ibid., Ill.
3Fischer-Frauendienst, Irene. Bismarcks Pressepolitk, (Munster(Westf.: Velag C. J. Fahle
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In diesem Entwurf sind nur die jenigien allgemeinen Grundsatze
aufgenomen, deren Anwendung auf die Pressgesetzgebung der
einzelnen Bundesstaaten als unbedingt nothwendig ercheinen urn die
aus dem Missbrauch der Preefeiheit erwachsenden Gefahren sicher
und nachhaltig abzuwehren.l
It became clear once again that at the root of this action lay the conflict
concerning the extent of Federal Diet power, Prussia seeking a narrow
interpretation and a weak Federal Diet and Austria seeking the opposite.
Prussia sought to create a general criteria by which the press could be
controlled in the German federation but denied the Federal Diet the right to
pass any laws which could supersede the laws already established in the
individual states.2 The Federal Diet could create the standard by which the
press could be repressed, but it was left at the will of the individual states
concerning the enforcement of such measures. Even in defining these
general principles however, Prussia and Austria had diverging views.
Prussia was not willing to have its propaganda tool against the Federal Diet
taken away. The general principles most opposed by Prussia were those
concerned with choking off criticism of the Federal Diet or other states in the
federation. Bismarck pointed out that in such a case an article written in one
state which supported Prussia in the Zollverein conflict could be condemned
in another and thus banned at a Federal level, something which would
clearly not be in Prussian interests.3 In lighter moments Bismarck wrote to
his sister how in the case of a German wide ban concerning criticism of the
Federal Diet, Heine's song:
1Poschinger, Bundestag, 124.
2Ibid., 124.
3Meyer, Kampf, 114.
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Oh Bund, du Hund
Du bist nicht gesund ...,
which Bismarck would have liked to make the "Nationalliede der
Deutschen," would be forbidden} Behind such thinking Bismarck sought to
give the press enough room to function as a Prussian tool in the power
struggle with Austria. In preventing such a censure law Bismarck specifically
protected the Prussian ability to continue the battle for public opinion which
raged over issues such as the Zollverein and reforms in federal politics. It is
clear here that Bismarck considered the press as a political tool and his
driving motivation in this struggle was IIdie von realpolitischen
Erwaegungen geleiteten Zweckmassigkeit und staatlichen Notwendigkeit." 2
In the conflict over the censure law one can get a clear look at
Bismarck's political priorities in Frankfurt. He supported the stringent press
laws in principle and:
Die Absicht der neuen Bestimmung des Bundes, dem monarchischen
Gedanken vor Angriffen der Presse zu schiitzen, entsprach durchaus
der junkerlich-konservitiven Gesinnung Bismarcks.3
In an incident wherein Herman Wagner made a press release in the
Kreutzzeitung criticizing the Prussian government for possibly
compromising on the Zollverein issue with Austria, Bismarck wrote to
Manteuffel:
In mir steigert der ganze Vorfall die Bereitwilligkeit, zu strengern
Massregeln gegen die Presse die Hand meinen hiesigen Collegen zu
bieten. Die conservativste Zeitung, sobaid sie Einfluss erlangt (und
ohne solchen niitzt sie nicht), wird ein zweischneidiges Schwert in den
lew, XIV, 336.
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Handen von Leuten, denen bei dem besten Willen und der grosten
Befahigung die Moglichkeit fehlt, sich in zusammenhangender
Einsicht und auf der politischen hohe der Fragen zu erhalten, welche
sie besprechen; personelle Antipathien verdrangen die ruhige
politische Erwagungen.1
There was in Bismarck no principle belief in the freedom of the press and he
was in general repulsed by such concepts of democracy, constitutionalism,
and public opinion. Bismarck's primary reason for blocking such a law "lag
daran, dass ihm in diesem Augenblick eine Beschneidung der Pressefreiheit
nicht im Sinne des besonderen preussischen Staatsinteresses, das er ar vor
allem vertrat, zu liegen schien.... Es ging ihm nicht urn die Sache der
Presse, sondern von dem Erfolg seiner Diplomatie im Interesse seines
Staates"2 In the face of Prussian resistance and the inability to implement
such a law through majority decision against Prussian will, the Federal Diet
was forced to either accept a censure law which would accommodate
Prussia's desires or have no law at all. What was left in the end was a
measure which did not even begin to approach Austria's original goals to stop
the attacks on the Federal Diet and put an end to Prussia's use of the press as a
propaganda tool against Austrian goals in the power struggle which was still
raging over the Zollverein and general federal reform.3
1GW, I, 206.
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After Three Years
Bismarck, from his entrance into the Federal Diet until the Prussian
victory over the censure law, was successful in thwarting all significant
attempts by Thun and the Austrian government to expand the Federal Diet's
authority or introduce the Zollverein conflict as an issue which could be
settle by this institution's authority. While he accepted the position as
Prussian delegate to the Federal Diet under the auspices of the arch-
conservatives with the mandate to seek rapprochement, it is clear by the time
Thun was removed from his post in 1853 following the defeat in the censure
law conflict that Bismarck had come to decidedly oppose Austrian politics. In
his judgment of the moral perfidy of his Austrian colleagues, his contentious
and ever watchful attitude concerning offenses against Prussian power and
dignity, his demand for Prussian equality in politics, etiquette and real
political influence in the Federal Diet, one can see that Bismarck had moved
away from his initial mandate of rapprochement with Austria and was now
playing a clearly adversarial role. In expressing his wish to leave the post
already in April 1851, Thun stated the opinion that he was not of the metal
that his successor would need to be in order deal with Bismarck's constant
pressure and expressed the belief:
So wird es durchaus nothwendig sein, dass der ... Vertreter Oesterreichs
ein durch und durch geriebener, pfiffiger Mensch sei, der den
preussischen Collegen das Fahrwasser abgewinnt, seine Plane und
Intriguen durchschaut und ihnen immer entgegenarbeitet.l
1Ibid." 35-37.
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Thun's successors were not to experience any great success in dealing with
Bismarck or in asserting the Austrian goals against the will of the Prussian
government. Thun's successor, Graf Prokesch von Osten, wrote of Bismarck's
efforts in the Federal Diet to stymie Austrian politics and his attempt to
influence German popular opinion on the issue of national unity:
Mit unermtidlichem Eifer betrieb Bisarmck die Lahmlegung und
Herabwtirdigung des Bundes; mit grossen Gewandheit und
ausgiebiger Bentitzung der ihm zur Verftigung stehenden Presse
wusste er die Schuld daran bsterreich, das ihm im Wege stand, in die
Schuhe zu schieben und Preussen als den hort der Zeitgemassen Ideen
hinzustellen.l
With both energy and skill Bismarck clearly pursued Prussian state interests
even at the cost of his conservative Junker political sentiments and
inclinations. He sacrificed supranational conservative solidarity to Prussian
state interests and in the face of Austrian intransigence in accepting Prussia's
demands for parity, became a bitter opponent of Count von Thun and his
government.
10sten, Prokesch von, Aus den Briefen des Grafen P. v. Osten, (Wien, 1896) 472.
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Political Ethos
Bismarck and Austria
During the three years in which Bismarck served in the Federal Diet he
became a bitter enemy of Austria and his overall political perspective became
much more clear. In the Olmiitz crisis he showed himself willing to fight
against Austria for Prussian power interests even in light of his arch-
conservative reputation. In Frankfurt he further showed his willingness to
sacrifice the belief of his backers in the solidarity of conservative powers in
Europe for an adversarial stance to Austria. He was willing to pursue
rapprochement, but such an approach was dependent on achieving for
Prussia the position in German and international affairs which he believed
his state warranted. He pursued conservative interests until they began to
impinge on Prussian power interests. One sees in these initial years at
Frankfurt a hardening in Bismarck's political ethos, which saw political
action being based increasingly on the interests of the state.1 He stated to
Minister Manteuffel in December 1853 concerning the plea made by many for
conservative German solidarity:
Diese Ueberzeugung [concerning the politics of interest] hat sich mir
im Laufe der bundestaglichen Verhandlungen vielfach aufgedrangt,
wo man, so oft wir unserer Hingebung fiir Deutschland gedenken,
derartige Auserungen zwar benutzt, urn uns beim Wort zu halten und
Opfer von uns zu verlangen, den ersteren aber sichtlich keiner
Glauben schenkt. Oesterreich, die deutschen Konigreiche und
1Pflanze, Bismarck and Development, 77.
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Grossherzogtumer mit vieleicht 2 oder 3 Ausnahmen sind meiner
Ueberzeugung nach jederzeit, wenn die Furcht vor iiberwiegender
Gefahr sich nicht zuriickhalt, bereit, jede politische Verbindung
einzugehen, die ihren partikerlistischen Zwecken fOderlich sein kann.1
These states defined the value of German and conservative politics in terms
of their own advantage and this had an increasingly negative effect on the
way in which Bismarck led politics. In this atmosphere he came to despise
the language of German nationalism or of conservative solidarity used in
Frankfurt as merely promoting individual state interests and as a mask for
interest politics. In this atmosphere, Bismarck began to make explicit his
political philosophy which one can see implicitly in even his earliest political
activity, when he viewed politics in terms of power and interests.
The conflict in Frankfurt was in Bismarck's eyes not just a conflict
between ministries which could be resolved easily on paper. He saw the
conflict as resulting from an intrinsic discrepancy of interest between the two
powers as both sought to gain the control or support of the medium and
small states in the German Confederation.2 Bismarck viewed the conflict
over the Zollverein which raged for most of his tenure in Frankfurt as an
inevitable result of the power political desires of the two nations in saying:
Das Bestreben Oestreichs, die deutsche Handelsgesetzgebung aus dem
Zollverein in den Bundestag zu verlegen, ist ebenso natiirlich als das
entgegengesetzte Preussens, seien Stellung im Zollverein nicht mit
Oesreich zu theilen.3
To use the old western motif, Bismarck believed that, "there's only room for
one of us in this town." In light of Austria's desire to impinge on what
1GW, I, 401-402.
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Bismarck referred to as Prussia's area of natural influence in Germany,
Bismarck wrote: "Ftir beide ist kein Platz nach den Ansprtichen, die Oestreich
macht, also konnen wir uns auf die Dauer nicht vertragen. Wir atmen einer
dem andern die Luft vor dem Munde fort, einer muss weichen oder vom
andern 'gewichen werden."I Under such conditions Bismarck was convinced
that:
Oestreich unser Freund nich sein kann und will. ... Es ... kann fUr
Oestereich nur eiene Frage der Zeit und der Opportunitat sein, wann es
den entschienden Versuch machen will, uns die sehene
durchzuschneiden.... So lange es nicht tiber die Abgranzung seines
und unseres Einflusses in Deutschland, vermoge einer geographsich
oder politischen Demarcationslinie, sich difinitiv verstandigt und die
Verstandigung in Vollzug gesetz hat, mtissen wir dem Kampf mit ihm
entgegensehn, mit Diplomatie und Luge im Frieden.2
In all of this Bismarck was not opposed to working with Austria at a
European level. He believed that a condominium in Central Europe between
Austria and Prussia with both powers having the final say in their respective
regions was a viable option.3 Bismarck in opposing Austria had clearly
defined prerequisites for dealing with the power struggle between Austria and
Prussia. That the two could exist cooperatively within the same geopolitical
region he doubted. He viewed the struggle over reforms in the Federation
not as a German issue, but rather as a power struggle at a European level.
Austria and Prussia needed to act as two powers at the European level.
Relations between the two could only be decided between Vienna and Berlin
and the two needed to determine the politics of the rest of the German states.
This influence had to be practiced in separate spheres or else one or the other
1CW,XIV, 334.
2Ibid., 441.
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state would be forced to forgo prestige and power at the European leveLl For
Bismarck the realities of power determined political policy. Based upon this,
Prussia and Austria had the natural right to precedence and priority in all
decision making in the Federal makeup of Germany. Such thinking was a far
cry form the considerations of his conservative backers who formed the
Camarilla who were primarily concerned with preserving old feudalistic
relationships.
Bismarck's Break with Conservativism
One can begin to see in Bismarck's early Frankfurt days a division in
the way he viewed domestic and foreign political policy. While
conservatives such as Leopold von Gerlach were obsessed with fighting the
specter of revolution on all fronts through the reenactment of a corporate
society in domestic affairs and the creation of supranational-conservative
solidarity against revolution, Bismarck approached foreign policy in face of
the conflict between Austria and Prussia in terms of Prussian state power
interests. He believed that the end goal of Prussian foreign policy was lito
preserve and if possible extend its external power.liZ The liberals sought to
mediatize Prussia and absorb it into and subject it to the German nation. The
conservatives sought to pursue an ideology of conservative solidarity which
Bismarck saw at the moment as being dangerous to the power interests of the
Prussian state. From his arrival in Frankfurt until the end of 1852, Bismarck's
1Ibid., 107.
2Ibid.,62
•87
thinking began to clearly contradict that of the conservatives, but this was
merely a consequence of his basic political assumptions which he had made
clear even during the Revolution of 1848 and the Olmtitz conflict as he
stipulated that political action be guided by Prussian state interests. From
Bismarck's writings one can see that: "Nach 1851 wandte er sich mit alIer
Entscheidenheit gegen die Aussenpolitik Fredrick Wilhelms IV, ... die auf der
Kooperation der legitimen Dynastian Mittel- und Osteuropas gegen die
Europasiche Revolution bestand."l As Bismarck entered the political scene
in Frankfurt: "
Waren die preussischen Konservitiven in Uberlegungen tiber eine
Theorie des Standesstaates vertieft, wahrend die Liberalen ebenso sehr
mit der Theorie des Rechtsstaates beschaftigt waren. Was Bismarck
interessierte, war aber nicht so sehr das Ideal als vielmerh die
Wirkllichkeit. Ntichtern-realistischees Auge gabe es weder einen
Standestaat noch einen Rechtsstaat, sonder lediglich den Machtstaat.2
Bismarck looked to Frederick the Great for his model of German politics and
rejected anything less than complete Prussian parity in German affairs.3 Even
in his support of the Olmtitz decision during his speech of Dec. 3 1850
Bismarck ultimately defended the decision to avoid war not because of his
desire for conservative solidarity but because he could see no clear state
objective or interest for doing so. The only reason for a major European
power to fight a war was if its material interests were at stake. The decision of
the Prussian government, according to Bismarck, needed to serve the good of
the whole community and not the goals of those who put ideology above the
1Pflanze, Otto, "Bismarck Realpolitik," in Lothar Gall, Das Bismarck Problem in der
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material needs of this community.! It is clear from this speech that the
community which Bismarck was referring to was not the corporate society
which the arch-conservatives sought or the unity of the conservative states.
In Bismarck's mind the community as a whole was for him not just an ideal
set of relations between estates and princes; it was in all circumstances
identical with the Prussian state.2 In this respect Bismarck was already deeply
divorced from the traditionalist conservatives. He stated later in his political
career: "Dem Auslande gegeniiber kann man in der Vertretung Preussens
nicht Parteimann in derselben scharfen Auspragung, wie im Innern,
bleiben."3 Concerning his attitude towards the internal politics of other
Federal states on their stance towards the revolution, Bismarck wrote in late
1851: "So entschiedene Abneigung ich dagegen habe, ... so habe ich doch
preussichen Egoismus genug, urn im Bezug auf hanoverschen Recht nicht in
demselben Grade gewissenhaft zu sein."4 In foreign policy the interests of
Prussia took precedent over conservativism.
While his view of foreign policy was not conservative, his perspective
on domestic policy and the need to stamp out revolution remained quite
firm.s He would not budge a single inch to the forces of revolution in his
defense of what he considered Stockpreussentum: the aristocracy, the
monarchy, and the army. On domestic policy "Bismarck tied power to law
and legitimacy in a way that could be called conservative only in that it
sought to preserve and promote the material and political interest of a
1Bismarck, Reden, 261-278.
2Call, Bismarck, 80£.
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conservative segment of Prussian society."l Bismarck could see no other
segment of Prussian society which could have served as the basis for a strong
state. The purpose of all politics in Bismarck's mind then was to preserve the
power of the state and his allegiance to conservative ideology, while not
insignificant, was secondary to that goal. This was in the future to deeply
divorce him from the ultra conservative to the point that in the end he was
to lose even the friendship of his "mentor" Leopold von Gerlach.
Bismarck's Realpolitik
The primary obligation of a politician was to serve the state according
to Bismarck. Bonds of personal or political sentiment had to be subject to this
aim. In his personal relationship to Thun Bismarck wrote:
Ich suchte den Grafen dariiber zu beruhigen, dass das Verfahren,
welches die preussicshe Regierung geglaubt habe einschlagen zu
miissen, durchaus keinen beziehung auf seine Person habe und dass
die Differenz nicht zwischen uns personlich, sondern zwischen den
Kabinetten liege und auch dort keine willkiirliche, sondern eine durch
die historischen und politischen Verhaltnisse gegebene sei."2
In a personal letter to Thun Bismarck wrote concerning the strained
relationship between the two: "Meien Aufgabe istll Preussicshe Politik, ebenso
wie es die Ihrige ist, Oestreichische zu treiben." He further points out that the
nature of the conflict finds itself in the historical realities which "weder wir
beide noch unsre Cabinette vollstandig beseitigen konnen."3 A politician was
1CaH, Bismarck, 54.
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according to such thinking obliged to pursue the interests of his state within
the given historical and material framework which he faced. The critics of
such politics in Bismarck's time condemned such practices as being
Schaukelpolitik wherein a politician has no friends, rather only tools which
one exchanged like a fork and knife between the courses of a meal.1 Bismarck
himself wrote sarcastically to his wife to be in he pre-political life: "An
Grundsatze halt man nur fest, solange sie nicht auf die Probe gestellt werden;
geshieht das, so wirft man sie fort wie der Bauer die Pantosseln und lauft ,
wie einem die Beine von Natur gewachsen sind."2 As a hardened polticain
he was to write later in his career: "Ein Regierungsprogramm, das fUr alle
Zeiten passt, kann es nicht geben wei! die Zeiten sich verandern. Es gibt
solche, in denen diktatorish oder reaktionar regiert, und andere in denen
liberal and progressiv verfahren werden muss."3 The mode of power had to
fit the needs and realities of the time. Bismarck in his early period as the
Prussian delegate to Frankfurt became enemy of Austria, but he stressed the
need to keep the door open to reconciliation, but only in light of achieving
parity and separate spheres of influence in German affairs so that neither state
would impinge on the other's power political needs. Bismarck sentiments
towards Austria were determined by the political needs of the time and
would change with the environment.
Bismarck in his later life remarked in an interview: "Dem Professoren
.... in den Zeitungen tut es unendlich Leid, dass ich ihnen nicht ein
Symbolum von Prinzipien geoffenbart habe, nach denen ich meine Politk
1Frauendiesnt, Presse Politik, 14.
2CW, XIV, 78.
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eingerichtet habe."l Bismarck insisted that politics could never be defined in
terms of any set of absolute values but stated that politics was the science of
the possible.2 This science he defined as an art for which a person had to
have the feeling to choose in each fleeting moment of a situation that which
was least harmful or most opportune.3 The reason for this approach to
politics was that, "in der Politik [gibt es] niemals volle Sicherheit und
definitive Resultate, ... alles [geht] stets berauf und bergab."4 It is in this spirit
that Bismarck stated concerning principle in politics:
Von einem Staatsman in erster Linie 'Konsequenz' zu verlangen, heist
ihm die Freiheit nehmen, sich nach der wechselnden Bediirfnissen des
Staates, dem veranderten Verhatlen des Auslandes oder nach
sonsitegen wichtigen Griinden zu entscheiden. Er muss sich stets nach
den jeweilig obwaltenedn Umstanden richten; er aknn die
vorlliegenden Tatsachen und Zeitstromungen nicht meistern, sondern
sie nur geschickt fiir seine Zwec ke benutzen. Er mus jede giinstige
Gelegenheit wahrnehemen oder aufsuchen, urn das durchzusetzen,
was ihm fUr das vaterlandische Interese richtig und zweckmassig
erscheint. Ob er dabei konsequent verfahrt oder nicht, ist eine vollig
gleichgiiltige Sache.5
There could be no instance where one could celebrate a complete victory,
because any given victory would create new circumstances and thus new
struggle. According to Bismarck, one could not even be certain of the
consequences of political decision until much later after the fact thus leaving
the political art in the realm of the uncertain and near incalculable.6 Based
upon this, one could not be certain that the principles which worked in the
1Ibid., 93.
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present situation would work in the future. Immutable principles could not
guide a politician, as these were an unreliable means of ascertaining the real
material needs at hand. The one principle which Bismarck saw as relevant in
all situations was the basic power needs of the state. Bismarck's most
essential political tactic in achieving this was, "standig Alternativen des
politischen Handelns bereitzuhalten."l The uncertain, ever-changing, and
unpredictable nature of politics led Bismarck to state that, "Man muss stets
zwei Eisen im Feuer haben."2 According to Bismarck a politician could not
shape the forces of history, nor could he grasp them in their completeness.
Added to this in his considerations was the unpredictable nature of his
political opponents. The only political method which Bismarck deemed
viable was to use those forces which were at hand to further one's own
position. According to such thinking, the more options a politician had at
his disposal, the better he would be able to choose the most beneficial path for
his state. Bismarck consistently sought to maintain a political position in the
fulcrum of events which left him with the possibility "in mindestens zwei,
haufig aber mehr Richtungen vorzugehn. Dadurch, dass er in jeder Stiuation
die Stellung bezog, die ihm die grosste Handlungsfreiheit erlabute, reduzierte
er die Manovrierfahigkeit seiner Gegner und steigerte seine auf ein
Maximum."3 Already in 1853 such political thinking is clear in Bismarck's
writings concerning the possibility of rapprochement with France. In
suggesting that the Prussian government avoid unnecessary insult towards
the French government Bismarck expressed the belief that political relations
1Pflanze, Realpolitik, 235.
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to France should be used to insure the political freedom and independence
from its eastern neighbors, specifically Austria. While he expressed a dislike
for the possibility of alliance with France, he could not discount it as an
option in pursuing the interests of the Prussian state.I According to such
thinking, Prussia needed to lay aside the traditional bonds of sentiment it
held for Austria as well as its dislike for France. Only in this way would it be
able to have the political freedom to pursue its state interest and succeed in
the struggle against Austria. The politician in Bismarck's mind was subject to
the same laws of survival which all living creatures were subject to and late
in his life he stated:
Ich wiirde keine Freunde haben, wenn ich nicht auch Feinde hatte.
Aus Kampf Besteht das Leben in der ganzen Natur, ... Kampf ist
iiberall, ohne Kampf kein Leben und wollen wir weiter leben, so
miissen wir auch auf weitere Kamfpe gefasst sein.2
Politics also being a constant series of struggles necessitated accordingly that
the politician's work would never be finished. It was such thinking which
made Realpolitik the only viable mode of action in the long term.
Bismarck, very much influenced by Lutheran pietism, ultimately did
find a justification for his politics of power which looked to a moral
justification beyond the power itself. Power did not justify power. The
frequent mistake is often made when looking at Bismarck's political thinking
to consider hisRealpolitik totally in terms of state power without considering
the role which the state played in Bismarck's view of God's authorship in
human history. A very important part of his totalWeltanschauung was a
firm conviction of a world determined by God where the state was a tool for
lew, I, 286.
2C W, XIII, 555.
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maintaining order, but not necessarily in the same way as his ultra-
conservative collegues. For Bismarck the sinful nature of man necessitated
the order and power of the state'! It was thus a moral mandate to protect the
authority and integrity of ruling state power. Part of this world order was
struggle and the friend-enemy relationship were natural and therefore a part
of the overall plan of creation.2 Bismarck believed that the state and the
unceasing struggle over power was part of the divine economy. In this way
he gave a moral basis for his politics of state interests which went beyond the
mere justification of power. As a statesman he believed in a duality of
Christian morality and political necessity where his obligation to serve the
state had a higher priority than observing the moral codes such as don't lie.3
The needs of the state necessitated according to Bismarck that a politician
practice such esteemed traits as honesty and openness only to the same degree
which his political opponent possessed them.4 In spite of such pragmaticism,
Bismarck's writing overflow with references to Treue, Pflicht, and
Verantwortung vor Gatt. Even in his practice of Realpolitik Bismarck
remained a immensely principled man. The highest moral calling or
principle of a statesman was to lay aside all feelings of hate, personal
preference or envy in pursuing state interests. Accordingly, not even the king
stood above this necessity of politics. To not act in this way was in Bismarck's
thinking an act of state infidelity.S Bismarck deplored the idealistic politics of
Frederick Wilhelm IV wherein Wilhelm sought through the Prussian union
1Mombauer, Realpolitik, 7£.
2Pflanze, "Realpolitk," 221.
3Pflanze, Bismarck and Development, 55.
4Thid., 389.
5Vossler, Otto, "Bismarcks Ethos," in Historische Zeitschrift 171, (1951), 18.
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plan to expand Prussian power, but then was not willing to use all
"bestehende Einfhisse" regardless of his personal sentiments to achieve this.
The king shirked his moral obligation to pursue to the end with all available
forces the expansion of Prussian power during this very opportune time and
put the Prussian state at great risk by seeking the extension of Prussian power
while being hindered by mere personal qualms.l That statesman who did not
put aside personal sympathies and animosities in pursuing the needs of the
state practiced in Bismarck's mind a form of personalWillkiir and ceased to
practice politics.2 Bismarck could work within this framework because he
saw the existence of political realities as being the consequence of God's will
and as a Christian "he felt released from an unbearable and existentially
intolerable responsibility for an unascertainable whole." He as a statesman
was merely a part of a historical whole which was impossible for man to
comprehend and of which he could the more effectively be the instrument
the more completely he accepted his own individual existence." It was
within this framework of thinking that calculable interests became the
measuring stick by which all decisions should be made as the forces of history
had to be accepted and worked with.3 Bismarck wrote his mother in law:
"Der Strom der Zeit Hiuft seinen Weg doch, wie er solI, und wenn ich meine
Hand hineinstecke, so thue ich das, weil ich es fur meine Pflicht halte, aber
nicht, weil ich seine Richtung damit zu andern meine."4 Bismarck felt
himself to be at the will of immeasurable and unstoppable historical forces
which he at the same time perceived as being intrinsically tied to the will of
lew, I, 435.
2Vossler, "Ethos," 274.
3Call, Bismarck, 92.
4ew, XIV, 249
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God. Writing to his wife concerning his position to the Federal Diet and the
difficulties which this would impose on his family, Bismarck stated: "Es ist
doch nach gottlicher und menshclicher Ordunung nicht andres thunlich; ich
habe die Sache nicht gemacht, ich habe keinen Wunsch, kein Wort dazu
gethan, das is mir eine Beruhigung." The condition of the time were like
"ein Rad, welches uns jetzt ergreift."1 Time and events were simply to big for
any given individual to stride against. He stated later to his wife concerning
the acceptance of the position in Frankfurt: "Ich habe es nicht gesucht, der
Herr hat es gewollt, muss ich annehmen, und ich kann mich dem nicht
entziehen, obschon ich voraussehe, dass es ein unfriichtbares und
dornenvolles Amt sein wird."2 In further expressing his belief in his
servitude to the forces of time and the conviction that he could not change
these forces, Bismarck wrote to his wife, "Ich bin Gottes Soldat, und wo er
mich hinschicht, da muss ich gehn, und ich glaube, dass er mich schicht und
mein Leben zuschnitzt, wie er es braucht. ... Was Gott thut, das is
wohlgethan, damit lass uns in die Sache hineingehn."3 In the most difficult
of times Bismarck wrote his wife from Frankfurt in a moment of
vulnerability, "dass ich weinen musste, wie ich im Bett lag, und Gott recht
innig bitten, dass er mir Kraft gebe, meine Pflicht zu thun."4 He saw himself
as a statesman being completely subordinated to his obligation as a servant of
the state and a product and part of the stream of time. Such thinking was to
go so far as to serve as a justification for what were the immoral acts necessary
to be a good statesman and, "Die verfolgung der Staatsraison wird zum
1Ibid., 207.
2Ibid., 206.
3Ibid., 208.
4Ibid., 209.
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moralischen Pflicht des Staatsmannes."l This "moralisher Pflicht" led
Bismarck to pursue the needs of the state within very clear boundaries.
Power was not the supreme moral justification of any action and Bismarck
wrote to Manteuffel concerning the pragmatism practiced in German and
European politics: "Fur einen Mensch, der nicht an Gott glaubt, die ihm in
Wege gottlichter Offenbarung auferlegt sind, sehe ich nichts in der Welt was
ihn abhatlen sollte ... ausser der Furch vor Schaden an Person und
Vermogen."2 It can only be assumed from such a statement that there were
limits as to how far Bismarck would go in pursuing power and that the extent
to which a state could expand its power was limited. Bismarck belonged to
the school of classical political thinking "which believed foreign and military
policy must be dictated by the reasoned interest of the state and pursued
within the limits of the balance of power system."3 This was a moral restraint
placed on the state as a whole because to do otherswise would not really serve
the interests of the state. The individual statesman, however, who worked
within this framework of thinking was subject to a clear moral dualism
wherein he lived by two codes of conduct. As a statesman Bismarck felt
released from the normal moral bonds he felt necessary to uphold in private
life because these were subject to what he perceived as a higher moral cause of
protecting and serving the state. It was thus that he was able to reconcile his
conservative inclinations in Frankfurt and his insistence on a conservative
order in Prussian domestic policy with his clear rejection of conservative
politics in his dealing with Austria as an enemy to Prussian state interests.
1Pflanze, "Bismarck Realpolitik," 220£.
2CW, I, 238.
3Pflanze, Bismarck and Development, 55.
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Conclusion
Bismarck later in his life was to very clearly formulate the
fundamental assumption which guided him perhaps only implicitly in
Frankfurt when he stated: "Auswartige Fragen sind keine Rechts-, sondern
Machtfragen. Sie lassen sich nicht durch jursitische oder volkerrechtliche
Theorie 16sen. Soweit sie nicht mit dem Schwert entschieden werden
miissen, tut man immer besser sich materiell zu verstandigen."1 It would be
easy to conclude from such a statement that his political philosophy was
based purely on pragmatism, that he was not bound by any moral obligations
and that the power of the state under which he served was the highest
obligation he answered to. It would be wrong, however, to count Bismarck
with the ranks of Napoleon or Hitler who practiced an unrestrained hunger
for power and were willing to take any measures to achieve their aims. For
Bismarck the power of the state in the final analysis served the purpose of
maintaining a divinely determined world order and it was with this
assumption that Bismarck pursued the power interests of Prussia. This
mandate placed him above the normal moral or ethical standards which were
enforced outside of the realm of politics. Bismarck was even willing to
trounce on what were for the arch-conservatives hallowed political relations
and traditions. While he sought the preservation of the traditional order in
Prussian domestic relations as that force which maintained the order and
IGW, IX, 400.
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authority of the state, the emphasis in his thinking was on that order and
authority and not on the institutions themselves. In this manner he could
justify the form of government and political philosophy based on the needs
of the time. Innate to his belief in this order and authority were limitations.
The practice of any form of Willkiir, the act of placing one's own desires or
fantasies above the immediate needs of the state, was for Bismarck the
"unpardonable sin" in politics.
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